# TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA

## EMBOLDENMENT

### 1NC

#### US-Turkey defense cooperation is low now. The continuity of the alliance is at a crossroads.

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After decades of speculation about the future of the U.S.-Turkish alliance, Washington and Ankara have finally reached a fork in the road. The day after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced plans to deepen defense cooperation with Russia, his government formally submitted a request to the United States for 40 new Block 70 model F-16 aircraft and upgrade kits for 80 F-16s already in service with the Turkish Air Force. The U.S. Congress may well block the sale. And even if it goes through, Erdoğan may well decide to buy more Russian weapons anyways. This impasse was the inevitable result of Ankara’s 2017 decision to purchase the Russian S-400 air defense system and Washington’s subsequent decision to impose sanctions and remove Turkey from the F-35 fighter program. As a result, the Turkish Air Force faces a serious issue in the near future. Ankara remains steadfast in its commitment to deploy the S-400, a system that Washington and major NATO allies have deemed a threat to Western tactical aviation. Absent a compromise on the deployment and location of the S-400, Ankara could be left without a fighter to replace aging F-16s. Turkey has made clear that it intends to develop its own fighter, dubbed TF/X, but the project is marred by issues with engine procurement and, at best, will not be produced at scale until the mid-2030s. In the meantime, the Turkish government has sought to leverage its ties with Russia to coerce Washington into making concessions on the F-16 sale. In late September, following his visit to New York for the United Nations General Assembly, Erdoğan expressed his irritation with U.S. President Joe Biden. He accused Washington of supporting terrorists in Syria, and suggested that the United States could not be trusted to provide the equipment to upgrade and sustain Turkish F-16s. As part of this effort, Erdoğan then travelled to Sochi, Russia in late September, where he met with Russian President Vladimir Putin. It was after this meeting that he announced the two countries could deepen defense cooperation to include work on fighter engines, submarines, and rocket motors. Erdoğan has also signaled that Ankara may, in fact, push ahead and import a second S-400 regiment from Russia. The United States has an interest in selling Turkey these F-16s. The Turkish government is a member of NATO and ancillary tensions over Syria should not negatively impact the sale of fourth-generation aircraft. But with trust so badly broken, it is unwise for Ankara to assume that U.S. policymakers will sign off on the export over concerns about “losing Turkey.” Playing the Russia card may not have its intended effect. The reality is that whatever Washington does, the United States and Turkey are rapidly reaching the last stage in their defense industrial decoupling. Legacy cooperation is now ending in favor of an autarkic Turkish effort to develop indigenous systems and find non-U.S. suppliers.

#### Enhanced security cooperation triggers Turkish aggression

Armbruster 21 (Natalie, Foreign Policy Research Associate Fellow at Defense Priorities, 10/8/21, Newsweek, “Turkey is Becoming a Problem for NATO—the U.S. Should Pay Attention | Opinion,” <https://www.newsweek.com/turkey-becoming-problem-nato-us-should-pay-attention-opinion-1636810>; accessed 6/20/2022) ng

Turkey, despite having the second-largest standing military force in NATO, is inching toward a point where it becomes a possible liability, instead of an asset. While not discounting the points of tension in Syria and Libya, the most glaring flashpoint for possible conflict is Turkey's enduring commitment to the defense of Azerbaijan against Armenia, through training Azerbaijani officers and supplying military equipment. Should a conflict erupt once more, it would be between Turkish-backed Azerbaijan and Russian-backed Armenia, presenting the potential for Turkey to, once again, be at odds with the Russian military and call for NATO aid or assistance. Even among NATO allies themselves, Turkey has fanned the flames of conflict, with Erdogan becoming more and more aggressive in the Mediterranean. In 2020, Turkey disregarded a U.N.-enforced arms embargo around Libya and responded with hostility when confronted by French patrols. Greco-Turkish tensions in the Aegean almost erupted into war in the same year after Greek and Turkish frigates nearly collided over drilling disputes, forcing the U.S. to step in and push for de-escalation and negotiations. Nevertheless, among these hostilities, Turkey has been left relatively unscathed by its NATO allies. As Turkey continues to stoke the fires of ongoing tensions, the U.S. must make clear that it will not fight Erdogan's wars under the obligation of NATO defense if these disputes erupt beyond Erdogan's control. Continued concessions and aid to U.S. partners, for simply being allies, are why American allies like Turkey have abused and taken advantage of these leniencies and strayed away from American interests. Alliances are not meant to be treated as sacred bonds of a covenant. They are formed to recognize parallel interests and commit to jointly serving those interests. NATO was formed to support European nations who wanted to counter the influence and might of Moscow and provide a unified defense against the now dissolved Soviet Union. If these same NATO allies are now flirting with Putin unapologetically, the U.S. should adjust the extent of its obligation to those whose interests lie opposite of American interests. The U.S. should rethink its responsibility of perpetual European defense and stop serving allies like Turkey their cake on a platter so that they can both have it and eat it too.

#### Specifically---that causes escalatory conflict in Syria. An explicit call-out reverses aggression.

Willis Krumholz 20. J.D., University of St. Thomas. "The US shouldn't support Turkey's reckless moves in Syria." Business Insider. 3-3-2020. https://www.businessinsider.com/the-us-shouldnt-support-turkeys-reckless-moves-in-syria-2020-3. accessed 6-20-2022 //ART

What's more, Turkish belligerence in Syria is revealing the cracks within the NATO alliance. America's European NATO allies are also relying on Turkey to control the flow of migrants from Syria into Europe—and Turkey's willingness to use this as a bargaining chip has given Turkey leverage over its European neighbors.

Going forward America needs to tread carefully, lest an alliance with Turkey drags the US into a wider conflict we have absolutely no interest in.

First off, the US State Department's unequivocal support for Turkey's actions is likely to embolden Ankara, as it stumbles into disaster in Syria. An emboldened Turkey increases the risk that Turkey and Russia stumble toward open conflict. Again, because Turkey is a NATO member, America has an Article 5 commitment to come to Turkey's defense if it is attacked.

By the way, Turkey already carries much responsibility for—from the get-go—funding the jihadist elements who fought in the bloody civil war. The Assad regime is brutal and has committed a host of human rights violations, but so have many of the jihadists Turkey has funded and armed.

Because of this, from an anti-terror perspective, Turkey is not the good guy in this fight. Areas outside the control of the Assad regime in Damascus are more hospitable to anti-US terrorists—including both ISIS and al-Qaeda. The fact that ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi was hiding out in one of these ungoverned spaces near Idlib is a stark reminder of this fact.

Turkey is neither a good friend nor an enemy, but right now America is committed to voice support for Turkey. That's a mistake. The truth is that NATO membership shouldn't be a one-way street, and collective-defense alliances with belligerent countries like Turkey are extremely far from cost-free. Cheerleading Turkey's footprint in Syria is the last thing the US State Department should be doing, as such a situation is directly opposed to US interests in the region.

Finally, an emboldened Turkey, less restrained in its attempt to depose Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, will also exacerbate the ongoing humanitarian catastrophe in Syria. Right now, Turkey is prolonging the civil war in Syria.

This undermines both American humanitarian and counterterrorism aims, because the longer the war goes on the more violence and suffering ensues. Instead of applauding Turkey's actions in Syria, because Turkey seeks to take out Assad, the US foreign policy establishment should be calling Turkey out for destabilizing the region further.

#### US-Russia war

Hunt 22 [Edward Hunt, PhD in American Studies from the College of William & Mary; "Turkey Is Threatening War Against Syrian Kurds"; Progressive.org; Published: 6-8-2022; Accessed: 6-24-2022; https://progressive.org/latest/turkey-war-syrian-kurds-hunt-220608/; KL]

As President Erdoğan mulls military intervention in Rojava, the Biden Administration is facing the fact that a NATO country could be the aggressor in the world’s next major war.

The United States is preparing for the possibility that Turkey, a NATO member, may invade Rojava, an autonomous region in northeastern Syria where both U.S. and Russian soldiers are currently stationed.

With Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan making increasingly ominous threats to launch a military intervention in Rojava, officials from the Biden Administration have been working to address these threats, aware that a NATO country could be the aggressor in the world’s next major war.

“Basically, Turkey wants to do the same thing that Russia is doing in Ukraine, which is to come in and commit war crimes against the citizens here,” said Nadine Maenza, the former chair of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, when she visited Rojava late last month. “I do hope the international community and the United States stand up.”

For several years, Turkey has been trying to destroy Rojava, a Kurdish-led enclave. The Turkish government wants to eliminate the region’s revolutionary Syrian Kurds, who have created an autonomous region inside Syria while providing a model of self-government for Turkey’s minority Kurdish population.

Erdoğan portrays Rojava’s Kurdish militants as terrorists. He accuses them of being part of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, a revolutionary movement that has been seeking Kurdish liberation in Turkey.

Turkey has already, in recent years, launched several incursions into Rojava. Its last major intervention, conducted in October 2019 with the support of the Trump Administration, devastated the area, leaving Turkey in control of a large swathe of territory.

Ceasefire agreements have created a highly complex environment, with security forces from several countries stationed in Rojava. Both Russia and the United States conduct military patrols, sometimes coming into conflict with one another.

Despite the Trump Administration’s backing of Turkey’s 2019 invasion, the United States has maintained a close partnership with Rojava’s Kurdish militants. Since the Syrian Civil War, the U.S. military has worked closely with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces in combating the Islamic State, and U.S. officials have repeatedly praised them for their bravery.

As a presidential candidate, Joe Biden described the Kurdish-led forces as “courageous” and indicated that he would continue to support them.

The Syrian Kurds have created a revolutionary new society on a model that they call “democratic confederalism.” Since the early years of the Syrian Civil War, they have been building a confederated and autonomous region in northeastern Syria that is democratic, pluralist, feminist, and multi-ethnic.

“Progressives should support their effort to build a secure base for direct democracy, feminism, and pluralism,” Meredith Tax wrote earlier this year in The Nation.

Though many U.S. officials oppose the Syrian Kurds’ revolutionary project, sometimes even working against it, others have praised them for their achievements. At a hearing last month by the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, several participants commended Rojava for its religious freedom and ethnic diversity, conditions that are unique to north and east Syria. And for the second year in a row, the commission called on the U.S. government to grant political recognition to Rojava.

“They’ve built a government where they have these remarkable conditions of acceptance and tolerance that really the rest of the world can learn from,” Maenza said during her visit to Rojava in May.

Turkey’s recent threats follow moves by Finland and Sweden to join NATO. Since Finland and Sweden have been sympathetic to the Syrian Kurds, with Sweden providing Rojava with financial and political support, Turkey has opposed NATO membership for the two countries.

Some analysts believe that Erdoğan is hoping the West will ignore another Turkish-led military intervention in exchange for Turkey’s support for Finland and Sweden to join NATO.

So far, the Biden Administration has moved slowly to address Turkey’s provocations. Though several high-level officials have stated their opposition to another Turkish military intervention, they have acknowledged that they are looking for ways to accommodate Turkey.

“Concerns that Turkey has raised directly with Finland and Sweden are being addressed by the Finns and the Swedes with the assistance of NATO,” said U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken in a press briefing last week. “We want to make sure that all allies have their security concerns taken into account, and that, of course, includes Turkey.”

For now, the main factor that could prevent the Biden Administration from siding against the Syrian Kurds is Rojava’s strategic importance in the Syrian Civil War. With the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces still controlling most of northeastern Syria, they have prevented Syrian President Bashar al-Assad from regaining control of an important region where oil reserves and wheat fields are located.

“That’s a point of leverage because the Syrian government would love to have dominion over those resources,” Blinken said in 2020, referring to the region’s oil. “We should not give that up for free.”

As Turkey continues to threaten Rojava, the situation is growing increasingly precarious, with recent reports indicating that Turkey has already begun conducting military operations. Any major Turkish-led military incursion could spark a broader conflict, which would be especially dangerous with U.S. and Russian forces continuing to operate in the area.

“A potential war will not be an easy one,” warned Mazloum Abdi, the leader of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, in a recent interview. “It will not end in a short period of time—unlike Turkey’s expectations. It will be a hard war and will last for a long time.”

### U---Coop Low

#### US-Turkey cooperation is zeroed now. Prefer evidence after Turkey’s support for Russia vs Ukraine

Gaber 6-22-2022, nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and at the Center in Modern Turkish Studies (Yevgeniya, “Turkey’s wartime bridge to the West is collapsing,” <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/turkeys-wartime-bridge-to-the-west-is-collapsing/>)

Russia’s unprovoked war of aggression in Ukraine has forced countries around the world to reexamine their geopolitical choices. Turkey, a strategic partner to both of the states at war, has been affected more than most nations. Caught in a lose-lose situation where taking any side in the conflict would lead to a major rupture with the other partner, it has tried to maintain amicable relations with both Russia and Ukraine. At the same time, the war has given Turkish leadership a chance to turn the challenges of this shaky equilibrium into an opportunity by positioning Ankara as a potential mediator between Moscow and Kyiv. While brokering a quick peace or even a ceasefire in this war is highly unlikely in the short term, Turkey nonetheless had a unique opportunity to mend its shattered relations with the West. However, nearly four months into the war, hopes for such a rapprochement are starting to fade, as Turkey’s balancing act gives way to a tilt toward Moscow. If Turkey wants to use the crisis to build bridges with the West, its time is running out. Promising start Prior to Russia’s invasion, Turkey and Ukraine had begun to develop a defense industry partnership that served as a security boost for both nations. It also drew praise for anchoring Turkey in the West, seemingly at the cost of deeper military ties between Ankara and Moscow. Turkey has been firm in its political support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine and has consistently refused to recognize Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea. Over the past few months, it has dismissed Russian criticism to deliver “Bayraktar” drones to Ukraine. In the early stages of the war, it closed off the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits to Russian ships, further raising hopes that it would align with the rest of NATO in Ukraine’s defense. Meanwhile, Turkey’s active diplomatic efforts for a peaceful resolution of the conflict have also garnered public praise from its NATO allies—something Turkish leadership highly appreciated after years of frosty relations with the West and with national elections looming in 2023. Senior American diplomats have made several visits to Turkey since the April launch of a new US-Turkey Strategic Mechanism aimed at normalizing bilateral relations. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu has traveled to the United States to meet Secretary of State Antony Blinken in the first bilateral meeting of cabinet officials since President Joe Biden took office. For the first time in a while, Turkey was not only acting in line with transatlantic allies but also taking a lead in the region in a way that has bolstered its importance as a key NATO member. US officials have gone as far as to suggest that Turkey transfer its S-400 missile-defense systems to Ukraine in a bid to finally solve the problem of Russian air defense systems stationed in a NATO member state and the consequent Western sanctions imposed on Ankara. Turkey has bluntly rejected that proposal. Instead, it has slowly allowed domestic problems, regional geopolitics, and pragmatism to dictate its approach to the war. As a result, Turkish leadership once again appears eager to continue business as usual with an increasingly isolated Russia. Shifting winds Though only obliged to close the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits for the naval ships of states at war under Article 19 of the Montreux Convention, Ankara has denied access to non-littoral NATO states as well. Turkey’s fears of losing out to the West in its ambitions for a kind of regional ownership of the Black Sea prevailed over the security threats posed by Russia. Turkey’s desire to limit the presence of NATO vessels in the Black Sea, which might lead to further escalation with Russia, is understandable—even if not in line with the Alliance’s objectives. It is harder to justify the statements of Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar wondering whether mines discovered in the Black Sea had been laid there deliberately to create an excuse for NATO minesweepers to enter those waters. Turkey is also blocking the quick addition of Sweden and Finland to NATO, trying to use the situation to solve its own problems and voice its own security concerns. It is highly unlikely that Turkish leadership will block the membership of the two Nordic countries in the long term. Nevertheless, its current diplomatic bargaining has revealed major differences in threat perceptions as seen from Ankara and other capitals. While for most of the European states, the major threat on NATO’s eastern borders is a revisionist Russia, for Turkey it is Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) and Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) fighters operating in Syria and allegedly finding a safe haven in Finland and Sweden. Obviously, skyrocketing anti-American sentiments in Turkey and a traditional mistrust for the West limit the possibilities for cooperation on Ukraine. Whereas the majority of Turks support Ukraine in this war, polls show that more than 48 percent blame the United States or NATO for the conflict while only 34 percent hold Russia responsible. There is a widespread belief in Turkish society that the war in Ukraine is just another regional conflict instigated by Western powers after Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and others. Russia’s invasions and aggression in in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Nagorno Karabakh, Transnistria, and more recently in Ukraine and Syria don’t evoke a similar response among Turks. Populist rhetoric, burgeoning ahead of next year’s elections, as well as massive anti-Western propaganda on Turkish media mostly featuring retired generals, nationalist pundits, and (pro-)Russian experts with a strong Eurasianist agenda, do not help either. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s economic and strategic agendas also depend on close coordination with Moscow. Russia supplies almost half of Turkish domestic gas demand, provides technology for the country’s first nuclear power plant in Akkuyu, and serves as the source of more than five million tourists annually. The Kremlin’s support is also vital for Turkey to maintain its presence in the South Caucasus and Middle East. The recent meeting of Çavuşoğlu with his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov in Ankara clearly showed that Turkey is keen to stick to mechanisms for cooperation with Russia, like the Astana Platform in Syria or the 3+3 format in the South Caucuses (which also involves Iran, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan). Instead of using this crisis as a chance to decrease its strategic dependence on Russia, Turkey seems eager to bind itself even more to Moscow within new formats. Money matters Ukraine has so far largely respected Turkey’s sensitivities and not pushed too hard on sanctions, instead focusing on arms supplies and Ankara’s mediator role. However, that dynamic is coming under stress with Russian oligarchs using Turkey as a safe haven to bypass European Union restrictions. According to Lavrov’s recent statements, Russia-Turkey bilateral trade doubled in the first quarter of 2022, and there are now ongoing talks on expanding the use of Russia’s MIR payments system in Turkey. In March, Erdoğan suggested to Putin that their countries switch to national currencies or gold in commercial deals instead of the dollar or euro. Izzet Ekmekcibashi, the head of the Turkish-Russian Business Council (DEIK), said that more than one thousand new Russian companies opened in Turkey in March alone. Most recently, a well-connected Turkish journalist reported on a Russian-Turkish agreement to move the European headquarters of forty-three leading Russian companies including Gazprom to Turkey. Turkish-Russian cooperation in tourism has also quickly developed. Turkish media outlets have reported that Turkish carriers are operating 438 flights per week to Russia this summer at a time when sanctions have made it difficult for Moscow to arrange flights. According to the pro-government Sabah newspaper, Turkish Airlines has signed a deal to bring 1.5 million Russian tourists over in 2022. The newspaper’s report suggests that Ankara also plans to issue loans under state guarantees to support Turkish travel companies working with Russian tourists and back a new airline with the specific mandate of transporting Russian tourists to Turkey. Ankara, which earlier called on Moscow to end its blockade of Ukrainian ports so grain exports could restart, is now taking a more pro-Russia position, advocating for the international community to help unblock not only Ukraine’s but also Russia’s trade in grain and fertilizers through safe logistics, ship insurance, and a return of Russian banks to the SWIFT system. During Lavrov’s recent visit to Turkey, Çavuşoğlu said that Turkey considered Moscow’s demands “reasonable” and “feasible” and backed easing Western sanctions against Russia. There is also ample evidence of Ankara’s involvement in the illegal shipment and trade of Ukrainian grain stolen by Russian forces to the Middle East via the Turkish ports of Samsun, Derince, Bandırma, and Iskenderun. So far, despite strong evidence of Russian crimes and official appeals from Ukraine, Turkish authorities have remained silent on these cases. These moves by Turkey don’t just undermine its credibility as a mediator between Ukraine and Russia but also raise questions about Ankara’s geopolitical choices in a broader regional and transatlantic framework. As it leans toward Russia in a bid for stability at home, Turkey risks finding itself estranged from the West and aligned with a pariah state on the international arena. The Ukrainian case will become a major test for Turkey. Whether Ankara prefers to use it to bridge the gaps with the West or to burn the bridges remains to be seen.

#### Assistance is low now

Koru 22, analyst at the Economic Policy Research Foundation (TEPAV) and a Black Sea Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI). (Selim, “WHAT RUSSIA’S NEW REALITY MEANS FOR TURKEY,” War on the Rocks, <https://warontherocks.com/2022/02/what-russias-new-reality-means-for-turkey/)//BB>

Further facilitating Ankara’s shift to a post-NATO stance is the fact that the benefits of alliance membership are already waning for Turkey. Ankara no longer has access to top-shelf NATO technology and appears less interested in defense guarantees. To be clear, Turkey has benefitted immensely from NATO membership. Its military was thoroughly shaped by NATO’s culture, standards, and technology. Turkey has also paid back the alliance as a stalwart member, honoring its obligations by contributing to missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan and hosting NATO’s Land Command. Its current policy isn’t about leaving NATO, but rather about shifting perspective. Former president Abdullah Gul used to say in the 2010s that it wasn’t important whether Turkey eventually joined the European Union — the accession process was about reaching E.U. standards. Once Turkey had reached that level, it might well decide to “be like Norway” and refrain from membership. Erdogan’s goal with NATO might well be the reverse. He is already in the club, but sees Turkey’s future as being elsewhere. He wants to move the country into a place where it won’t necessarily leave, but it won’t have to worry about what other members think of it either. Take the most salient issue: air defense. The backbone of the Turkish air force is the F-16 fighter jet, the product of very fruitful Turkish-American cooperation in the 1980s. Turkey also joined the consortium for the F-35, the fifth-generation fighter jet. During the Syrian Civil War in the early 2010s, Turkey relied on American-made (American, Dutch, German, and Spanish) Patriot air defense systems to guard its southern border, and wanted to buy its own batteries from the United States. But this cooperation broke down. To this day, when asked in private meetings, Erdogan insists that the United States would not sell him the Patriot system. American officials deny this, arguing that they offered favorable terms. Then, soon after the 2016 coup attempt, Turkey purchased the Russian S-400 air defense system. The Americans argued that the F-35 could not co-locate with the Russian system for security reasons, and booted Turkey out of the F-35 program. Now it isn’t even clear whether Congress will allow American firms to modernize Turkey’s F-16 fleet. European countries also have de facto sanctions on Turkey over issues ranging from Syria policy to human rights abuses. Given its world view, the Erdogan government doesn’t seem to mind. Erdogan’s stump speech on defense policy features the story of how U.S. sanctions on Turkey following its 1974 intervention in Cyprus spurred the development of the country’s defense industry. He is also quick to point out that when his government wanted to buy Reaper drones from the United States and was denied, it set about creating its own world-class drone program. “Bad neighbors have made us into home owners,” Erdogan likes to say, arguing that U.S. sanctions are now going to drive the development of the TF-X, Turkey’s first indigenous fighter jet.

### U---AT Aggression Now

#### Cutting Turkey off from western assistance tames their revisionist goals

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Drifting apart from the West

Nonetheless, Turkey’s eagerness to embark on a nuclear-weapons program should be seen in the bigger context. There are clear indications that the Eurasianist ideology creeps in Turkey’s top-ranking policymakers. Analysts identify this ideology as a Turkish version of the Ba’athism in the Arab world. The Eurasianists argue that Turkey’s interests lie outside the Western world and therefore should join the “anti-imperialist” camp led by Russia and China.

When speaking about Afghanistan, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said: “Imperial powers entered Afghanistan; they have been there for over 20 years. We also stood by our Afghan brothers against all imperial powers.” A similar statement made by the Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan, revealed the common grounds of the two Sunni forces in their ideological (and religious) beliefs. He said that the Taliban are “breaking the chains of slavery.” Some would argue that both statesmen are influenced by the jihad theorist Sayyid Qutb (author of the influential book “Milestones”) and his idea of victimization of Muslims by foreigners or “imperialists”. He believed that western nations are attempting to undermine Islamic empowerment thus jihad is the tool to liberate the “suppressed” Muslims from the “imperial powers” (see also 1 , 2 , 3).

Conclusions

It is evident that the alleged new venture of Turkey in the nuclear weapons field is in all cases a cause of serious concern for its Western allies. Its decision to drift away (1 and 2) from the North Atlantic alliance and become a strategically autonomous Eurasianist power, presupposes the acquisition of a nuclear arsenal. This will lead to a reflexive nuclear arms race of key states in the wider sensitive region, hindering the already fragile balances and undermining the existing Euro-Atlantic security architecture. Such prospect cannot be reversed by false hopes on a softer policy after a leadership change in the Turkish elections of 2023, or worst by transactionalism that will boost Turkey’s confidence. It is arguable that Turkey’s overambitious geopolitical balancing act is pushing the limits of its diplomatic, economic and military capabilities. Therefore restraining its activities in these fields (especially its military hardware / technology as well as the space, missile and nuclear programs) by the states affected most and the US, is most likely to weaken its eagerness and tame its revisionist goals.

### Link---Appeasement

#### Absent pushback, Erdogan’s expands military presence into multiple hotspots.

Aykan Erdemir & Philip Kowalski 20. Erdemir is the senior director of the Turkey Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a former member of the Turkish parliament. Kowalski is a research associate at the Turkey Program of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, “‘Blue Homeland’ and the Irredentist Future of Turkish Foreign Policy”, War on the Rocks,9-30-2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/09/blue-homeland-and-the-irredentist-future-of-turkish-foreign-policy///SJ

Turkey and Greece, two NATO allies, nearly experienced a full-fledged military conflict in August. Two of their warships collided during a naval standoff over hydrocarbon exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean. This follows a similar naval incident in June between three Turkish vessels and the frigate of another NATO ally, France, prompting an inquiry that the alliance has been trying to keep under wraps to prevent further discord among its ranks. Behind these incidents lies Turkey’s embrace of an assertive naval concept, namely the “blue homeland,” that is poised to disrupt the transatlantic alliance in the years to come.

The “blue homeland” is an irredentist concept that claims vast sections of the Aegean and Mediterranean seas, including Greek and Cypriot maritime borders and hydrocarbon deposits, for Turkey. What began as a fringe idea among the anti-Western brass of the Turkish navy has morphed into a popular nationalist aspiration fronted by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. “Blue homeland” will continue to damage Ankara’s diplomatic relations, since Erdoğan will find it difficult to step away from maximalist claims he has personally cultivated.

The tendency to see the Turkish president’s belligerence merely as posturing for domestic consumption, and failure to develop a concerted transatlantic strategy, has provided Erdoğan with the time and opportunity to institutionalize his irredentist thinking. Absent pushback from the West, Turkish foreign and security policy will reflect Erdoğan’s worldview for decades to come. The United States and the European Union should, in response, work together to discourage the Turkish president from continuing to play a destabilizing role in NATO’s southeastern flank. They should also engage and support Turkey’s pro-Western dissidents and help amplify their voices in a media landscape almost entirely dominated by Erdoğan. Coordinating a Western response — while extremely difficult — is essential to mitigating the most damaging effects of current Turkish foreign policy.

Background to ‘Blue Homeland’

The “blue homeland” naval concept, first coined in 2006, does not stem from Erdoğan’s Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party. Instead, as Ryan Gingeras lays out in detail in his War on the Rocks piece, its origins lie with two staunchly secularist naval officers who later developed links with the Maoist-rooted neo-nationalist Homeland Party. The party and its predecessor, the Workers’ Party, were once fierce opponents of Erdoğan and his political party. However, the Homeland Party has since entered into a tactical alliance with the Justice and Development Party as the Turkish president gradually turned to his former adversaries among the ultranationalists and Eurasianists (a faction that advocates Turkey joining the Russia- and China-led anti-Western geopolitical camp) in a bid to hold onto power.

Cem Gürdeniz, a retired Turkish rear admiral who is one of the architects of the “blue homeland,” presents the concept as a response to an existential threat, and offers it as guaranteeing the ability to “sleep comfortably at home.” Gürdeniz sees the Ottoman failure to control the seas as the cause of the empire’s demise and warns that naval supremacy is crucial for the survival of the Turkish Republic, which in his opinion continues to remain in the crosshairs of Western imperialism. While the “blue homeland” is most immediately linked to maximalist Turkish claims in areas where Cyprus and Greece assert jurisdiction, Gürdeniz ultimately argues that it is also key for Turkey’s expansion of its political and economic influence across the region. Since he believes that “the Mediterranean is not sufficient for an expanding Turkey,” he urges Ankara to take control of the “Persian Gulf, Sea of Oman, Arabian Sea, Red Sea, the Eastern waters of the Atlantic Ocean, [and] North Africa.” Within the Eurasianist paradigm, the “blue homeland” is part of a broader strategy of confronting the West and establishing Turkish supremacy in the region.

For Erdoğan, this concept is also a means to expand Islamist influence. More specifically, he hopes that Turkish domination of the Eastern Mediterranean will boost Turkey’s military and proxy presence in Libya, Syria, Iraq, and beyond, and thereby strengthen the footprint of the Muslim Brotherhood and its agenda.

#### Appeasement makes Erdogan feel invulnerable to American pressure. Increases aggression.

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A LOT OF HONEY AND SOME VINEGAR

U.S. policymakers have often pursued a “more honey than vinegar” policy toward Turkey, emphasizing incentives, which has not yielded results. The underlying rationale for this approach is the idea that intensive American diplomacy could encourage Ankara to support the United States and that Turkey is too important a “strategic partner” to risk creating a rift. Presidents Bush, Obama, and Trump have been willing to countenance the Turkish government’s efforts to undermine U.S. policy in large part because of the utility of Turkey’s Incirlik Air Base.

Yet officials in Washington tend to underestimate the hidden costs associated with their willingness to strike agreements with Turkey over the use of the base. The problem was brought into sharp relief on July 22, 2015, when, after a year of negotiations, the Turkish government gave permission for the anti-ISIS coalition to undertake combat operations from Incirlik. As part of the deal, the Turks were supposed to increase their operations against the Islamic State, while U.S. policymakers provided assurances that the United States would increase its help to Turkey in the fight against the PKK. The Turks, by their own admission, prioritized the latter at the expense of the former.20 The Obama administration chose to overlook the Turkish government’s ambivalence about the counter-ISIS campaign so long as the United States continued to have access to Incirlik.

The agreement over the base had broader implications, however. It sent the message to Ankara that Turkey is indispensable to the United States, which leaves Washington vulnerable to Turkish threats to rescind permission to use Incirlik. This, in turn, led Turkey’s leaders to believe that they could act without regard for U.S. interests. Until recently, the White House had been publicly passive in response to a range of Turkish policies that were unhelpful, even damaging, to American interests. For example, after Ankara arrested a number of Turkish employees of the U.S. Embassy and harassed their families in October 2017, the Trump administration suspended visa processing for Turks traveling to the United States. In an effort to forestall continued decomposition of bilateral ties, the administration rescinded the order soon after. In response, Turkish leaders have simply pocketed American goodwill without any reciprocal effort, as they have routinely done in the past, and continued to target Foreign Service nationals.

#### Concessions to Turkey validate their behavior. Increases aggression.

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Clearly, democracy is not the only game in town anymore in Central Europe. While many Western stakeholders might be tempted to make concessions to the region’s illiberal strongmen in order to preserve EU and NATO unity, this approach was a key enabling factor and will only continue to weaken European and transatlantic organizations further. In the face of the clear authoritarian threat posed by Russia and China, challenging these trends in Central Europe to strengthen the democratic integrity of the Western alliance is more crucial than ever.

#### Unconditional assistance triggers aggressive and non-cooperative allied behavior

Sullivan 11, Professor at UNC-Chapel Hill, with Brock Tessman, Assistant Professor at Georgia and Xiaojun Li, PhD in Political Science from Stanford (Patricia, “US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation,” *Foreign Policy Analysis*, No. 7)

In this model, we anticipate a paradoxical effect of military aid in which powerful donor states become dependent on the recipients of their military aid (Mott 2002). The United States gives military aid to gain leverage and influence. But it is in a competitive market for leverage through aid; it must compete with other states to keep its influence over client states. At the same time, we can assume that the United States chooses to invest heavily in training and equipping the military forces of other countries, with all the attendant risks this entails, because it needs something from these states. Materially weak states can exploit the fact that a much stronger donor relies on them to provide some vital good—and the threat of defection to an alternative supplier—to exert influence over the donor. According to Mott (2002), during the Cold War, US security assistance recipients learned to manipulate the United States ‘‘by putting Moscow and Washington into an aid competition, by diversifying across suppliers, and converting the expected recipient dependence into a perverse sort of supplier dependence’’ (8). Although the Cold War competition with Moscow is no longer central to US foreign policy, other states and even nonstate actors have stepped in to replace the Soviet Union as alternative arms suppliers. Stokke (1995) observes that strong states have typically used foreign aid ‘‘as a lever to promote objectives set by the donor, which the recipient government would not have otherwise agreed to’’ (12). But Singer (2003) argues that the increasingly privatized military market ‘‘fundamentally alters this patron-client relationship’’ (211). Since weaker states can now purchase weapons on the open market, the patron’s ability to influence client behavior is greatly diminished. Generous US military funding runs the risk of creating militarily strong, assertive clients that become more willing to ignore US interests (Mott 2002). Recipient states should be more likely to defy the United States if they believe that the United States will be unable or unwilling to punish them for defection (Walt 2005). US dependence on recipient states for oil, troop basing, over-flight permission, counternarcotic and counterterrorism operations, etc… makes withdrawing aid potentially more costly for the United States than for the aid recipients. It may be easier for aid recipients to find alternative suppliers than it would be for the United States to find an equally valuable place to base its troops.

### Link---Security Cooperation

#### Security Cooperation with religiously fractious states cause crackdown on political dissidents and incites religious conflict

Bushey 17, J.D., SUNY Buffalo Law School, Buffalo, New York, 2007 (Adam, “GOVERNANCE: THE MISSING INGREDIENT IN SECURITY COOPERATION,” <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1038564.pdf)//BB>

Well-intentioned SC/SA programming can harm partner nations in four ways. First, the U.S. could negatively affect the rights and protections of citizens within a country if there is a lack of transparency and checks and balances in the defense institutions. 160 For example, when DOD has ignored host nation corruption in the past, which has had detrimental results. As written in 2016 by Lieutenant General H. R. McMaster, current U.S. National Security Advisor, “Paradoxically, avoiding state building or sidestepping the political causes of state weakness in the hope of avoiding costly or protracted commitments often increases costs and extends efforts in time.”161 In fragile states, the government often does not have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Therefore, the default in fragile states is often self-protection forces and other powerbrokers providing security, distributing aid, delivering justice, and supplying jobs in lieu of government intervention. They operate along ethnic, religious, or tribal lines and are frequently under political protection. While U.S. assistance to self-protection forces may secure short-term gains, such as in Afghanistan, these forces over the long run often exploit weaknesses in the political and economic systems, and “have a tendency to evolve into predatory groups, attacking external enemies while extorting or preying upon their own community.”162 Such extortion and corruption actually reinforce ethnic, religious, and other divisions that fuel cycles of violence, thereby making peace more difficult and prolonging the need for international forces. Instead, foreign assistance should be used to support the government in displacing these groups. While this thesis does not address conflict countries, it should be noted that in 2014, DOD concluded that the United States’ initial support of warlords in Afghanistan created an environment that exacerbated criminal patronage networks and fostered corruption, which ultimately had significant unintended consequences for U.S. strategy.163 Second, harm can be done by empowering a military that already has undue influence in a country without also strengthening oversight institutions. Unmatched military assistance to an already militarized society may tip the scales of power and permit the military to act as a tool to “suppress democratic opposition or movements.”164 In fact, “a coup or attempted coup occurred once every four months in Latin America (1945-1972), once every seven months in Asia (1947-1972), [and] once every three months in the Middle East (1949-1972).”165 There have been forty-four coups in West Africa alone over the last fifty years.166 Not all of these coups were antidemocratic, not all were successful, and not all of them were even against democratically elected regimes. Nonetheless, the point remains that if SC/SA programs followed the framework of other U.S. Government foreign assistance initiatives, security sector programs would be part of a multidimensional effort, and would incorporate systematic assessments and simultaneously address weak government policies, inadequate laws, or poorly functioning legislatures to counterbalance any assistance given to a military with a misbalance of power. It is USAID’s position that when legislative committee and bill drafter capacity is increased, additional checks and balances on overly powerful executives or corrupt ministries of defense can be established as an additional oversight body to safeguard against power-grabs.167

### Link---HR Violations

#### Enhanced military assistance drives human rights violations

Sullivan 18, associate professor in the Department of Public Policy and the Curriculum in Peace, War, and Defense at the University of North Carolina (Patricia, et al, “Arming the Peace: Foreign Security Assistance and Human Rights Conditions in Post-Conflict Countries,” *Defence and Peace Economics*, doi:10.1080/10242694.2018.1558388)//BB

Only a handful of other studies systematically investigate the impact of military aid on civilian populations outside the context of an ongoing war. This scholarship tends to focus on weapons transfers. Like much of the literature on economic aid, the bulk of the research on arms transfers concludes that major conventional weapons transfers to developing countries increase human rights abuses and impede democratization (Blanton 1999a, 1999b, de Soysa, Jackson, and Ormhaug 2010). More recently, Pamp et al. (2018) find that conventional weapons imports increase the risk of intrastate conflict onset – particularly in countries with other risk factors for political violence. This study echoes results from Craft and Smaldone (2002) who find that arms imports increase the risk of civil war in sub-Saharan Africa. In sum, extant research leans toward a pessimistic outlook on the prospects for foreign assistance to improve human security in fragile and conflict-affected countries. While there is some evidence that economic aid could increase the capacity of governments to deter violent nonstate actors and lessen armed conflict, most studies suggest economic aid, military assistance, and arms transfers all negatively impact governance and human rights conditions.

#### It militarizes all of society

Sullivan 18, associate professor in the Department of Public Policy and the Curriculum in Peace, War, and Defense at the University of North Carolina (Patricia, et al, “Arming the Peace: Foreign Security Assistance and Human Rights Conditions in Post-Conflict Countries,” *Defence and Peace Economics*, doi:10.1080/10242694.2018.1558388)//BB

The second link between security assistance and human rights violations arises out of the ability of the regime to distribute military training, weapons, equipment, and funding as private goods. In states in which civilian control of the military is not solidly institutionalized, support from the military is always essential to regime survival – and the military has incentives to resist any loss of authority or autonomy. Foreign military aid and arms transfers can be used to buy the allegiance of a military elite, ensuring their loyalty in the face of challenges from the wider citizenry (Savage and Caverley 2017, Biddle 2017, Biddle, Macdonald, and Baker 2018). This aid reinforces the privileged position of the military, empowering it relative to other state institutions and giving it an incentive to work with the ruling regime to repress liberalization efforts that are likely to redistribute power and resources away from the military (Savage 2017, Call 2002b). In many war-torn countries, the military exercises control over internal security and is responsible for significant violations of human rights. In these countries, major reforms that would improve human rights conditions after conflict termination are only possible if the military is significantly weakened and their role in internal security is curtailed and brought under civilian control (Call 2002b). But an empowered military is likely to strongly resist any additional accountability, loss of autonomy, or restriction of its internal security role. Donors, for their part, may even encourage the armed forces to retain their role in providing internal security to suppress threats to the donor’s own business or geostrategic interests (e.g. communist insurgents during the Cold War, drug traffickers or terrorist groups more recently) (McClintock 1992, Huggins 1998). As Biddle (2017) warns, security assistance provided to the armed forces in authoritarian countries can encourage transformation of the national military into an abusive praetorian guard – loyal to the regime or a particular sector of the population, rather than an apolitical defender of the state. If foreign security assistance reduces a government’s incentives for investing in public goods, lowers the marginal cost of repression, and strengthens the security sector relative to other government institutions, we should see increased violations of human rights when post-conflict countries receive military aid. The receipt of lethal aid from foreign governments is neither a necessary, nor a sufficient, mechanism for turning post-conflict countries into repressive states. However, all else being equal, the provision of lethal aid will increase the likelihood of a package of policies and choices that will result in human rights violations.

#### It’s exclusively true for military aid

PSD 20, Peace Science Digest (The article bolds “foreign security assistance” and and then boxes the definition of FSA. This cutting makes clear that the definition is linked to the bolded phrase, “Military Aid Worsens Human Rights Conditions in Post-Conflict Countries,” https://peacesciencedigest.org/military-aid-worsens-human-rights-conditions-in-post-conflict-countries/)

Foreign assistance to post-conflict countries is a key feature of global engagement to encourage peace in such contexts. According to recent research conducted by Patricia Sullivan, Leo Blanken, and Ian Rice, the type of aid matters. They argue that **foreign security assistance** [bold in original]

Begin definition

[**Foreign security assistance**: “any state-authorized provisions of weapons, military equipment, funding, military training, or other capacity building goods and services to the security forces of a foreign government.”]

End definition

is linked to state repression in post-conflict countries. Non-military aid, or Official Development Assistance (ODA), appears to have the opposite effect—positively correlating with human rights protection. Thus, the type of foreign assistance has a powerful influence on the “quality of peace” in post-conflict countries.

The authors find these results by analyzing 171 instances in which violent conflict ended from 1956 to 2012. These instances are studied as country-year units in the decade following the end of an armed conflict between a government and an armed opposition movement within the country. They test for state repression via a Human Rights Protection score that measures physical integrity rights violations such as torture, extrajudicial killings, disappearances, political imprisonment and executions, and genocide/politicide. The scale runs from -3.13 to +4.69, where higher values represent better protection of human rights. For the sample included in the dataset, the scale runs from -2.85 to +1.58. The dataset also takes into account the presence of peacekeeping forces, gross domestic product, and other relevant factors.

The key variables of interest include data on ODA, which is relatively easy to find, and security assistance, which is difficult to find. Most countries do not release information on military aid and certainly not systematically enough to warrant inclusion in a dataset. However, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) produces a dataset that estimates the volume of global arms imports, which the authors used for this research. They caution that this approach to measuring security assistance likely underestimates the true volume of military trade between countries.

Their results indicate that foreign security assistance is related to lower levels of human rights protection, resulting in an average 0.23 drop in the Human Rights Protection score (the scale of which is from -2.85 to +1.58). To compare, if a country experiences a renewed violent conflict, the Human Rights Protection score drops 0.59 points on that same scale. This comparison provides a benchmark for the seriousness of the Human Rights Protection score drop as a result of military aid. ODA, on the other hand, is associated with improved human rights. In generating predicted values for Human Rights Protection scores in post-conflict countries, ODA “appears to improve human rights conditions in the decade after conflict termination.”

The authors explain the effect of military aid on state repression by focusing on the strategic choices available to national leaders in countries emerging from armed conflict. These national leaders generally have two pathways to maintain power: (1) focus on securing public goods for the largest number of people—like investing in public education—or (2) focus on securing private goods for the minimum number of people required to maintain power—like investing in security forces to enhance the state’s repressive power. Given the resource constraints common in post-conflict countries, leaders must make hard decisions about how to allocate funds. Simply put, foreign security assistance tips the scale such that repression, or the second pathway, becomes appealing for governments. In short, the authors argue that “foreign security assistance reduces a government’s incentives for investing in public goods, lowers the marginal cost of repression, and strengthens the security sector relative to other government institutions.”

The authors point to examples in U.S. foreign policy to demonstrate this point. For instance, U.S. security assistance to South Korea following the Korean War bolstered a repressive state that committed numerous human rights violations until mass protests ushered in a democratic government decades later. The authors link these examples to a larger conversation about the “quality of peace” in post-conflict countries. The end of formal hostilities is one way to define peace. However, the authors argue that state repression of dissent, which security assistance encourages, especially in the form of human rights violations like “torture, extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, and political imprisonment,” is a poor “quality of peace” despite the formal end of civil war.

Informing Practice

The “quality of peace” that takes shape after war is critically important because the risk of armed conflict recurrence is high. According to data collected by Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) (see “Conflict Recurrence” in Continued Reading), 60% of all armed conflicts recur within the decade following the end of hostilities due to “unresolved grievances” in the post-war period. An exclusive focus on bringing an end to hostilities, without a clear commitment to human rights or a plan for how the country might address the structural conditions which led to war, may only serve to further entrench existing grievances and structural conditions that will beget more violence.

International interventions aimed at ending war and preventing armed conflict recurrence need to consider how their actions may influence these outcomes. As we discussed in our previous Digest analysis, “Presence of UN Police Associated With Nonviolent Protests in Post-Civil War Countries,” militarized solutions, whether in policing or peacekeeping, result in worse outcomes for human rights, as militarization entrenches a cycle of violence that normalizes violence as an acceptable form of political expression. This insight is critically important for how national governments—particularly those of powerful, highly militarized countries like the U.S.—conceive of their foreign assistance, especially whether they favor military or non-military aid to post-conflict countries. Rather than encourage peace and democracy, which foreign aid is intended to do, it appears that security assistance has the opposite effect, encouraging state repression and increasing the likelihood of armed conflict recurrence. Many have warned about the militarization of U.S. foreign policy, including individuals within the Defense Department and intelligence agencies (see “The Problems of a Militarized Foreign Policy for America’s Premier Intelligence Agency” in Continued Reading). They have questioned how an over-reliance on the military and militarized solutions affects how the U.S. is perceived around the world. While perceptions are important to international relations and foreign policy, foreign security assistance, more fundamentally, undermines the goals of creating a more peaceful and democratic world. This article demonstrates that a reliance on security assistance as a form of international aid worsens outcomes for recipient countries.

The clear policy recommendation from this article is to increase non-military ODA [Official Development Assistance ] to countries emerging from war. Non-military aid could incentivize spending in social welfare programs and/or transitional justice mechanisms necessary to address grievances that encouraged war in the first place and that may continue in the post-war period, thus contributing to a strong quality of peace. Moving away from an over-reliance on military spending and security assistance, both in domestic and foreign policy areas, continues to be the best way to ensure long-lasting and sustainable peace. [KC]

### Link---Military Improvement/Advancement

#### Any advancement of the Turkish military will be used against the Kurds

Bodette 22, Director of Research at the Kurdish Peace Institute (Meghan, “How US Security Assistance Funds Turkey’s Anti-Kurdish Aggression,” Progressive International Wire, <https://progressive.international/wire/2022-05-05-how-us-security-assistance-funds-turkeys-anti-kurdish-aggression/en)//BB>

In the name of “fighting the PKK,” Turkey currently occupies swaths of territory in Iraq and Syria, carries out ethnic cleansing of Kurds, Yezidis, Assyrians, and other minorities, empowers jihadist militias, hinders the fight against ISIS, and jails tens of thousands of civilians on spurious “terror” charges, including democratically elected MPs and mayors from the progressive pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) and its predecessors.

U.S.-trained officials continue to lead these policies. A Department of Defense document created in or after 2018 to track IMET-trained officials who rose to positions of prominence in their home countries includes nearly 70 Turkish personnel. The first and highest-ranking Turkish official on the list is identifiable as Defense Minister Hulusi Akar, who is recorded as having trained in the United States between January and June of 1987.

Since taking over Turkey’s Ministry of Defense in 2018, Akar has overseen a particularly violent era of Turkish foreign policy: a devastating invasion and occupation of northeastern Syria, multiple attacks on Iraqi Kurdistan, and an escalating campaign of extrajudicial killings of Kurdish and Yezidi leaders in the fight against ISIS and the effort to stabilize their homelands.

In an ironic twist, both Akar and the Defense Ministry as a whole were sanctioned by the United States for “endangering innocent civilians” and “undermining the campaign to defeat ISIS” during the October 2019 invasion of the Syrian cities of Serekaniye and Tal Abyad.

Today, as Turkey launches a new military invasion of Iraqi Kurdistan and cracks down harder than ever on Kurdish and non-Kurdish political opposition alike, the State Department has requested $1,450,000 in IMET aid for the country for fiscal year 2023. Given the program’s track record, it is difficult to see this as anything other than an investment in dictatorship, endless war, and a military solution to the Kurdish question—failed policies that have brought nothing but death and destruction to the region.

### Link---AT Plan is Just Talks

#### Negotiation itself is status-recognition that is perceived as accommodation

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Another obstacle to comprehensive negotiation is that the leading global powers may consider negotiation itself to be a major concession to the aspiring challengers. Cooperative resolution of proxy conflicts was practiced by the United States and the Soviet Union in the late 1980s. However, that period was unique in that the USSR was eager to dismantle the bipolar system while experiencing serious economic overextension, so it sought to do away with the conflicts tarnishing its reputation and depleting Soviet financial resources. At the end of the 2010s, agreement to negotiate may mean unwarranted accommodation. It has been noted that the very fact of engagement in negotiation confers status on the parties that are invited to negotiate (Zartman, 2008). Conceding status may meet with the same kind of domestic impediments as attempted grand bargains discussed above.

### Link---AT Cooperation Turn---Specific

#### **Every Turkish conflict in the Middle East proves Western appeasement is met with Turkish adventurism.**

BPC 16. Bipartisan Policy Center, “Beyond the Myth of Partnership: Rethinking U.S. Policy Toward Turkey”, Bipartisan Policy Center, December 2016, https://bipartisanpolicy.org/download/?file=/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/BPC-Turkey-Partnership-Myth.pdf//SJ

Myth: Erdogan is a strongman America can work with or appease.

Despite the evidence, it still might be tempting to conclude that Erdoğan could prove to be an authoritarian leader with whom Washington could have a mutually beneficial, transactional relationship—as it did with Egypt’s General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, for example, or even with the Turkish generals who came to power after the country’s 1980 coup. In this light, observers have been tempted to dismiss Erdoğan’s most provocative positions, especially in foreign policy, as rhetoric designed for domestic consumption that does not necessarily reflect Ankara’s actual interests. Yet this optimism misunderstands both the depth and sincerity of Erdoğan’s anti-Western attitudes and the extent to which his populist rhetoric comes to shape policy. This assessment also ignores the extent to which Erdoğan’s consolidation of power makes Turkish policy more erratic, more dependent on Erdoğan’s shifting personal ambitions, and, in many cases, more divorced from reality.12

Erdoğan’s apparently sincere belief that the United States orchestrated a coup attempt against him, for example, is perhaps the most telling example of how deep Erdoğan’s anti-American thinking goes and how easily it can influence Turkish policy. Following the trauma that unfolded on the night of July 15, Turkish government rhetoric—coming from the president, the prime minister, the AKP cabinet, and the pro-AKP media—has argued that the United States backed the effort with a degree of vehemence and consistency that suggests real conviction. Turkey’s labor minister, Süleyman Soylu, was perhaps the most direct, declaring, “America is behind the coup.”13 Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım was only slightly subtler, saying Turkey would “consider itself at war with any country that supports Gülen.”14 Ibrahim Karagül—writing in a newspaper controlled by Erdoğan’s in-laws—went further, arguing without evidence that the United States actually tried to kill the Turkish president. From Erdoğan to ordinary citizens, it seemed impossible that such an event could have unfolded without Washington’s complicity, especially when the coup’s supposed mastermind, Gülen, resides in the United States. In subsequent statements, Turkish officials argued that as long as Washington kept “sheltering” Gülen, it could never be considered a friend of Turkey’s.

The result of this suspicion is that even if the administration tried to reassure Ankara by, say, handing over Gülen, the sense of abiding hostility would remain, creating a fundamental cleaving of interests. More importantly, Erdoğan long ago realized the value of anti-American posturing as a way of mobilizing his base and discrediting his opposition. With Erdoğan trying to consolidate his power as president and fend off the potential fallout from a likely economic crash, this anti-American approach will become even more important to his domestic position.

Yet even absent this unique anti-American dynamic, there is good reason to doubt that appeasement could ever be an effective strategy—especially when Turkish policy is driven by domestic concerns. The story of Turkey’s failed refugee deal with Europe might be the best example of this. When European leaders worked out an arrangement with Ankara in which Turkey would receive financial and political benefits for preventing the flow of Syrian refugees into Europe, many observers denounced it as a cynical capitulation, particularly as European leaders went on to mute their criticism of Erdoğan in order to ensure the deal’s survival.

The German government even allowed a lawsuit to proceed against a comedian who mocked Erdoğan on television.15 But if the deal was cynical, it was also short-lived and short-sighted.16 Turkey’s eagerness to arrest Kurdish politicians and human rights advocates—who, in calling for peace, supposedly supported the PKK—made it impossible to amend Turkey’s anti-terrorism laws to come into compliance with the legal requirements for EU visaliberalization.17 With Turkey refusing to make this change, and, more broadly, persecuting critics and driving the country toward a destabilizing civil conflict, EU officials were confronted with the distinct possibility that allowing Turks to travel to Europe visa-free would result in a new wave of Turkish refugees and asylum seekers in place of the Syrians they were already trying to limit. As a result, the European Union was unable to move forward with the liberalization process, which had been one of the most popular concessions offered by Europe. Turkish politicians responded to this impasse by lashing out at the European Union, condemning Europe’s hypocrisy and supposed support for terrorism.18 Not surprisingly, this reaction only deepened the backlash against the deal among European critics, making it more difficult for pro-inclusion European leaders to further fulfill their end of the agreement, and leaving the deal teetering on the edge of collapse. 19 In short, even when European leaders were willing to look the other way on Erdoğan’s political excesses and sins, it was his very authoritarianism that ended up undermining the security goals they were trying to cooperate with Turkey on.

Europe’s experience, indeed, has been indicative of the results Washington has obtained in its periodic efforts to curtail criticism of Turkish authoritarianism in return for concessions on crucial foreign policy issues. While Washington has inspired considerable anger in Ankara by cooperating with Syrian Kurds in the war against ISIS, it has at the same time tried to assuage that anger by turning a blind eye to Ankara’s blatant assaults on basic freedoms. Vice President Joe Biden’s visit to Turkey at the height of the government’s postcoup purge stood out as a particularly striking example of this approach, especially when he seemed to imply that there was no need for Washington to speak out as no one had actually been executed yet. While in the short run Biden’s silence may have won limited cooperation from Ankara, it has not prevented tensions from escalating over plans for how to take Raqqa from ISIS or over threats to disrupt the operation by targeting Syrian Kurdish forces.20 Indeed, as Ankara has redoubled its crackdown on Kurdish politicians within Turkey, arresting a number of leading members of the pro-Kurdish People’s Democracy Party,21 it has only increased the odds that Turkey’s domestic Kurdish conflict will spill over into Syria and undermine the war against ISIS there. In other words, Washington looked the other way on Turkey’s domestic fight against the PKK in the hope that this would win greater cooperation in Syria, but it is now Ankara’s domestic war with the PKK that is pushing Turkey toward intervening against the YPG.22 Trying to sideline Turkey’s domestic challenges in the hope of securing foreign policy cooperation is a strategy that will only fail.

### Link---AT Cooperation Turn---General

#### Security cooperation causes anti-alignment from recipient states. It triggers allied aggression and entrapment

Sullivan 11, Professor at UNC-Chapel Hill, with Brock Tessman, Assistant Professor at Georgia and Xiaojun Li, PhD in Political Science from Stanford (Patricia, “US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation,” *Foreign Policy Analysis*, No. 7)//BB

The United States spends more than eleven billion dollars per year on direct military assistance to foreign governments and substate groups (USAID 2009). The American government expresses a wide variety of goals motivating their use of military assistance as a foreign policy tool. Frequently, US administrations have explicitly linked military aid or arms transfers to a quid-pro-quo expectation of compliance from a government (Sislin 1994). More generally, military assistance is expected to augment US national security by increasing recipient state cooperation with US objectives. According to the State Department's 2007 Report to Congress: Section 1206(f) of the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act:

Security cooperation remains a critical foreign policy tool that allows the United States to advance its national security interests worldwide…. Building partner nation security capacity is one of the most important strategic requirements for the United States to promote international security, advance U.S. interests and prevail in the war against terrorism (1).

Importantly, the policies that guide the provision of US military aid have changed significantly in recent years. Shortly after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the Bush administration sent Congress an antiterrorism bill that would have lifted all restrictions on military aid and arms transfers to foreign governments in cases where such assistance could “help fight terrorism” (Federation of American Scientists 2002, 1). The provision specifically called for lifting bans on counterterrorism aid for states with a history of human rights abuses or noncooperation on counterterrorism.1 The bill was eventually modified to include “sunset clauses” and some requirements for Congressional oversight, but it initiated a year of radical changes in the way US military aid was allocated, restricted, and justified. In 2002, Congress amended the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, removing Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan from a list of states barred from receiving US arms transfers. The United States has also extended military aid to Pakistan, the Philippines, Turkey, Georgia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Oman, Yemen, Uzbekistan, and Columbia, among others, in the name of rewarding or encouraging cooperation in the fight against terrorism (DSCA News Releases, 2002–2008).

What are the consequences of US military aid in a rapidly changing, unpredictable global security environment? In this study, we systematically investigate the effects of US military assistance on recipient state behavior toward the United States between 1990 and 2004. Our analysis improves upon existing studies in several ways. First, we develop three competing, clearly defined, and falsifiable theoretical models of the relationship between military aid and recipient state behavior. These models—Arms for Influence, Lonely Superpower, and Reverse Leverage—range from a conventional understanding of US military aid as a way to buy cooperation from the recipient state to a more counterintuitive assessment of US aid as a sign of American dependence on the recipient government for the provision of some foreign policy good. Second, our focus on the post-Cold War era allows us to measure recipient state compliance using events data rather than the UN voting records that most studies rely on. Third, we employ multiple statistical methods in order to match our empirical models to the hypotheses we are testing. For example, a number of our hypotheses predict a reciprocal relationship between military aid and cooperation or anticipate selection effects. To address these challenges, we use both a simultaneous equations model with fixed effects and a two-stage Heckman model. Finally, we control for pre-existing preference similarity between the United States and aid recipients in our empirical analyses, so that our results capture the influence military aid has on recipient state behavior independent of any dyadic predisposition toward cooperation or conflict.

Our research is relevant to larger academic debates about the utility and limitations of foreign aid as a policy instrument. We attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of foreign aid, and security assistance more specifically, in terms of its ability to move recipients toward more cooperative foreign policies. We test the conventional “arms for influence” explanation of military aid but find that the relationship between US assistance and recipient state behavior is considerably more complicated. In general, we find that military aid does not lead to more cooperative behavior on the part of recipient states. With limited exceptions, increasing levels of US aid are linked to a significant reduction in cooperative foreign policy behavior with the United States. US reaction to recipient state behavior is also somewhat counterintuitive; instead of using a carrot-and-stick approach to military aid allocations, our results show that increased recipient state cooperation is likely to lead to subsequent reductions in US military assistance.

The results of our inquiry also have implications for US foreign policy. Policymakers and military advisors invariably justify military assistance to foreign governments on the basis of an expectation that providing military aid to these governments will increase US influence over the recipients' foreign or domestic policies. In the 1980s, despite concerns about Pakistan's efforts to develop nuclear weapons, the Reagan administration began providing direct military assistance to Pakistan and funneling money and weapons to Afghan rebels through Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The primary objective was to support Islamic insurgents fighting the USSR and the Soviet-backed government of Afghanistan. And, in one important sense, the US policy was a tremendous success. The Afghan rebels prevailed and the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan—a result some attribute directly to US assistance and, more specifically, to the highly accurate FIM-92 Stinger Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs) the US provided. However, several hundred of the Stinger missiles are unaccounted for, and Osama bin Laden is thought to have procured a number of Stingers and other SAMs with which he could target US military or civilian aircraft (Jane's Intelligence Review). Moreover, the Pakistan Army's Inter-Services Intelligence diverted an unknown quantity of US arms and assistance to groups it considered less threatening to Pakistan than the Afghan mujahedeen—including some radically anti-US Islamic factions (Debate in US House, June 22, 2001). After a total ban on military assistance to Pakistan throughout the 1990s, the United States resumed providing billions of dollars of military assistance and arms to Pakistan after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (Grimmett 2009). And, once again, there are concerns that Pakistan is channeling some of the money to extremist groups on its border with India. Perhaps more seriously, the ISI remains closely linked to the Taliban militants the American military is fighting in Afghanistan (Gopal 2008; Mazzetti and Schmitt 2009; Murphy 2010).

#### Military support causes more defiance

Sullivan 11, Professor at UNC-Chapel Hill, with Brock Tessman, Assistant Professor at Georgia and Xiaojun Li, PhD in Political Science from Stanford (Patricia, “US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation,” *Foreign Policy Analysis*, No. 7)//BB

In this paper, we attempted a systematic investigation into the relationship between US military aid and the level of foreign policy cooperation exhibited by the states that receive that aid. We aimed to improve on the existing literature by building and testing three explicit theoretical models (Arms for Influence, Lonely Superpower and Reverse Leverage), focusing on a new measure of cooperation generated from events data rather than UN voting records, and controlling for preference similarity, so that our results capture the influence military aid has on recipient state behavior independent of any dyadic predisposition toward cooperation or conflict.

We test seven hypotheses associated with three different theoretical models and find mixed results. There is little evidence in favor of the Arms for Influence model: there is an inverse relationship between absolute levels of US military aid and recipient state cooperation, and there is no relationship at all between recipient state dependence on US aid and recipient state behavior. Thus, while the Lonely Superpower hypothesis was on the right track by predicting an unorthodox relationship between aid and cooperation, it did not perform as well as some of the Reverse Leverage hypotheses when it came to explaining exactly what form such unorthodoxy would take.

In several ways, the Reverse Leverage model was quite accurate: (i) states receiving military aid from the United States exhibit lower levels of cooperation than states that do not receive military aid, (ii) in the population of all states, higher levels of military aid appear to produce more defiant behavior, and (iii) the United States does not punish defiance with reductions in aid or reward greater cooperation with increases in military aid. Together, these results suggest that US military assistance is allocated for reasons that are largely independent of overall recipient state behavior toward the United States. The Reverse Leverage model contends that military aid is delivered to states that the United States depends on for security reasons. Realizing their leverage over Washington, states that receive high amounts of aid are actually more able to engage in uncooperative behavior than are states that the United States does not depend so heavily upon. We attempted to test for the effects of an aid recipient's “security value” directly by comparing US allies to nonallies. Consistent with the Reverse Leverage model, we find that states with a defensive alliance with the United States are more likely to receive US military aid but less likely to respond to aid by increasing their cooperation with American preferences.

#### Studies!

Sullivan 11, Professor at UNC-Chapel Hill, with Brock Tessman, Assistant Professor at Georgia and Xiaojun Li, PhD in Political Science from Stanford (Patricia, “US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation,” *Foreign Policy Analysis*, No. 7)//BB

In the results from equation 1, we see that, contrary to Hypothesis 1a (Arms for Influence), but consistent with Hypothesis 3b (Reverse Leverage), there is a significant, negative correlation between levels of US military aid and recipient state cooperation. Economic aid, on the other hand, appears to have no effect on recipient state cooperation. The recipient country's GDP and S score are also not correlated with a state's behavior toward the United States. Recipient states that are democratic, and those that have US troops stationed on their soil, appear to be more cooperative with the United States, all else equal.

Table 3 presents results from using equation 1 to simulate the substantive impact of the statistically significant independent variables on recipient state cooperation. States that do not receive any US military aid display an average level of cooperation with the United States of +1.5 when all other variables are held constant at their means. The model predicts that states that obtain the average amount of US military aid ($20 million) will be less cooperative—scoring an average of −11 on the cooperation-conflict scale. An increase in US military aid to one standard deviation above the mean leads to an additional six-point reduction in the monthly cooperation score of the recipient state. In contrast, an increase in the number of US troops from its mean to one standard deviation above the mean raises recipient state cooperation almost one point. Democratic recipients are on average four points more cooperative than nondemocratic recipients.

## SYRIA

### !---Brink

#### Syria war on the brink

Cambanis 6-7-2022, senior fellow and director of the international policy program at The Century Foundation in New York. He teaches at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs (Thanassis, “Turkey Is Playing With Fire in Syria—Again,” *World Politics Review*, <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/30591/a-turkish-incursion-could-re-escalate-the-syria-civil-war?utm_source=WPR+Free+Newsletter&utm_campaign=e735059915-062422-insight-nonsubs&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_6e36cc98fd-e735059915-64932347&mc_cid=e735059915&mc_eid=3c1d62e367)//BB>

While the war in Syria has receded from the international spotlight, residents in the country’s northeast are bracing for a new wave of armed conflict. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has for months threatened to launch a military invasion of the region to push back Syrian Kurdish fighters and create a buffer zone in the border area between the two countries. Turkish military deployments and diplomatic outreach to Russia suggest that a decision from Ankara to launch a military operation is likely and may even possibly be imminent.

### !---Escalates---ME

#### Syria escalates and draws in great powers

Jeffrey 12-13-2021, Chair of the Middle East Program at the Wilson Center. He served as a Foreign Service officer in seven U.S. administrations, most recently as Special Representative for Syria Engagement and Special Envoy to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. (James, “A Deal Is Still Possible in Syria,” *Foreign Affairs*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2021-12-13/deal-still-possible-syria)//BB>

As U.S. President Joe Biden and his team focus on the Iran nuclear file, the war in Syria remains a festering wound at the heart of the Middle East. Although the current administration has made no dramatic departures from the approach of previous administrations, its decision to deprioritize the conflict comes at a particularly bad time. Opportunities to find a solution to the Syria crisis are now emerging—and the United States should devote the diplomatic energy necessary to seize them. The keys to success after years of failure include not just high-level engagement but a realistic assessment of what can be achieved in any deal.

The risks in keeping Syria on the back burner are significant. The conflict is already a strategic train wreck: a victory by President Bashar al-Assad’s regime would send a message to autocrats across the globe that mass murder is a viable tactic for retaining power and signal the regional ascendance of Assad’s Russian and Iranian enablers. It has also spawned geopolitical threats, from the rise of the Islamic State (also known as ISIS), to the deployment of Iranian precision missiles that target Israel, to the massive refugee flows that threaten to destabilize neighboring states and Europe. And for Syrians themselves, the decade-long civil war has resulted in horrendous casualties, displaced half the population from their homes, and left most citizens destitute. If left unaddressed, these dynamics will threaten to destabilize the Middle East for years to come.

Syria’s war has also drawn in the U.S., Israeli, and Turkish militaries, and the risk of clashes between them and Iranian, Russian, and Syrian forces remains very real. Washington views the Syrian Democratic Forces’ (SDF) enclave in northeastern Syria as an important ally against ISIS, but Ankara views the Kurdish group as a terrorist threat. Two recent provocations—Assad’s violation in July of a 2017 cease-fire in the southwest that had been negotiated between U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin and an attack by Iranian-backed fighters in October against U.S. forces at their al-Tanf base in southern Syria—came without noticeable American response and could encourage Assad or the Iranians to escalate in areas patrolled by Turkish or U.S. troops.

### !---ISIS

#### Enhanced Turkish incursions into Syria trigger ISIS resurgence

Akil 6-23-2022, \*Visiting Fellow at the Centre for Arab & Islamic Studies. He holds a Bachelor of International Relations (Honours) from La Trobe University, Melbourne, and a Master of Middle Eastern & Central Asian Studies from the Australian National University, Canberra. He has a strong interest in diplomacy, conflict resolution, humanitarian aid, and Middle Eastern Affairs, and Australian-MENA relations with a specific focus on Syria and the Levant as a whole. Samy is the co-founder and managing editor of the ANU based Near East Policy Forum and a non-resident research fellow at the Operations & Policy Center in Gaziantep, Turkey. He is fluent in English, Arabic, and German., \*\*policy analyst focused on the Middle East and North Africa. He holds a master’s degree in International Affairs from American University’s School of International Service. (Samy and Alexander Langlois, “How Turkey’s position

on Ukraine is further

destabilising Syria,” Lowy Institute, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/how-turkey-s-position-ukraine-further-destabilising-syria)//BB

Turkey continues to signal a Syria operation against this backdrop. Erdogan’s most substantial threat came in a 1 June speech to AKP MPs, homing in on the Kurdish-controlled towns of Tel Rifaat and Manbij.

Targeting these areas carries substantial risks. In response, local Kurdish groups in Tel Rifaat have organised with Iranian, Russian, and pro-government forces. For its part, Moscow has publicly and privately expressed discomfort over a Turkish advance multiple times and increased patrols in these areas. To date, Turkey has not substantially built up its forces along the border, although the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) opposition militias could lead an assault.

Ankara’s goal of repatriating one million Syrian refugees to “Safe Zones” in northern Syria will perpetuate this crisis and remains ambiguous.

Still, many dynamics that hindered Erdoğan’s offensive last year still exist, particularly regarding the Russian and US presence in the northwest and northeast of Syria, respectively. Given geopolitical interests and their patronage of stakeholders in these areas, neither state appears keen on ceding ground to Ankara.

Indeed, Washington rejects any assault given its support for the Kurd-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). US forces stationed east of the Euphrates River to fight the Islamic State also block an offensive, which explains Erdoğan’s focus on Manbij and Tel Rifaat.

However, Moscow is disinclined to support an offensive or land-swap deal that previously undergirded Turkish offensives west of the Euphrates. Former US Special Representative for Syria Engagement Jim Jeffrey has indicated this on numerous occasions based on previous diplomatic efforts.

This position probably hardened given Turkey’s stance against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, not limited to Erdoğan’s decision to invoke the Montreux Convention – closing the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits – and close its skies to Russian-Syria flights. That said, Russia could be interested in Ankara’s continued blocking of Finland and Sweden’s NATO accession in exchange for some land.

Regardless, immediate consequences abound should an attack occur. The region has not recovered from the 2021 drought – the worst in 70 years – or a substantial deterioration in living standards and international aid. Furthermore, both Manbij and Tel Rifaat, home to over 550,000 people, hold a significant number of internally displaced people within an area already hosting roughly 2.8 million.

Ankara’s goal of repatriating one million Syrian refugees to “Safe Zones” in northern Syria will perpetuate this crisis and remains ambiguous. Between 2016 and 2021, only around 110,000 Syrians returned from Turkey, representing less than three per cent of the 3.7 million Syrian refugees today. The areas from previous incursions continue to suffer from institutional corruption and bleak economic outlooks, resulting in riots in al-Bab, making voluntary returns unlikely.

Politically, Turkish advancements will probably harden Syria’s de facto partition as no stakeholders are prepared to cede ground for a political agreement. A larger Turkish presence in Syria will deepen disagreements between these actors at the expense of peace and stability.

Regarding security, an offensive will foster increased violent reactions from the YPG, who intend to induce a state of chaos in Turkish-held areas to prevent resettlement and ethnic cleansing. This continues a cycle of violence that destabilises the entirety of northern Syria – opening the door for extremist groups such as Islamic State to flourish at the expense of the average Syrian.

#### The impact is existential

Hubbard 1/31/22 [Ben Hubbard, Beirut bureau chief for the NYTimes, Asmaa al-Omar contributed reporting from Beirut, Lebanon, Eric Schmitt from Washington and Jane Arraf from Hasaka, Syria; “ISIS, Thriving in Unstable Places, Proves It’s Still a Threat”; Jan. 31, 2022; DOA: 6/25/22; <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/29/world/middleeast/isis-syria-iraq.html>; Lowell-ES]

BEIRUT, Lebanon — One week after Islamic State fighters attacked a prison in northeastern Syria, where they have held out despite a heavy assault by a Kurdish-led militia backed by the United States, the terrorist organization published its version of what had gone down.

In its official magazine, it mocked how many times in its history its foes had declared the Islamic State to be defeated. Its surprise attack on the prison, it crowed, had made its enemies “shout in frustration: ‘They have returned again!’”

That description was not entirely wrong.

The battle for the prison, in the city of Hasaka, killed hundreds of people, drew in U.S. troops and offered a stark reminder that three years after the collapse of the Islamic State’s so-called caliphate, the group’s ability to sow chaotic violence persists, experts said. On Saturday, about 60 ISIS fighters still controlled part of the prison.

In Iraq, ISIS recently killed 10 soldiers and an officer at an army post and beheaded a police officer on camera. In Syria, it has assassinated scores of local leaders, and it extorts businesses to finance its operations. In Afghanistan, the withdrawal of American forces in August has left it to battle the Taliban, with often disastrous consequences for the civilians caught in the middle.

The Islamic State, which once controlled territory the size of Britain that spanned the Syria-Iraq border, is not as powerful as it once was, but experts say it could be biding its time until conditions in the unstable countries where it thrives provide it with new chances to expand.

“There is no U.S. endgame in either Syria or Iraq, and the prison is just one example of this failure to work toward a long-term solution,” said Craig Whiteside, an associate professor at the U.S. Naval War College who studies the group. “It really is just a matter of time for ISIS before another opportunity presents itself. All they have to do is to hang on until then.”

The Islamic State, whose history goes back to the insurgency following the United States’ invasion of Iraq in 2003, reached the summit of its powers around 2015, when it ruled multiple cities in Syria and Iraq, attracted droves of foreign fighters from as far away as China and Australia, and ran a sophisticated propaganda machine that inspired or directed foreign attacks from Berlin to San Bernardino, Calif.

A military coalition led by the United States partnered with local forces in Syria and Iraq to roll it back, until a Kurdish-led militia, the Syrian Democratic Forces, pushed it from its last patch of territory in early 2019.

Since then, the organization has morphed from a top-down, military-style bureaucracy to a more diffuse and decentralized insurgency, according to terrorism experts and regional security officials.

But the importance of the prison as a target suggested that last week’s attack would have been green lit “by the highest levels,” Mr. Whiteside said. The group’s ability to mobilize dozens of fighters and break into a prison that American and S.D.F. officials long suspected was a target was an achievement and a propaganda coup no matter how the siege turns out.

A senior American official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said the probable goal of the operation was to free some of the group’s senior or midlevel leaders and fighters with specific skills, like bomb-making. The official estimated that perhaps 200 prisoners had escaped.

The Islamic State has struggled to rebuild. The killing of its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in October 2019 deprived it of a unifying figure, and its new leader, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi, is largely unknown. Tighter border controls have blocked foreign fighters from getting to Iraq and Syria, and persistent raids by U.S.-backed forces in both countries have largely pushed it out of the big cities and into the peripheries.

In Iraq, the group ramped up attacks in 2019 and 2020, but they have declined since then in both quantity and quality, according to an in-depth analysis of attack data published this month by Michael Knights, the Jill and Jay Bernstein Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and his colleague, Alex Almeida.

“For now, at the outset of 2022, the Islamic State insurgency in Iraq is at a very low ebb, with recorded attack numbers that rival the lowest ever recorded,” they wrote.

They cite a range of factors: a greater security presence in rural areas, thermal cameras that can detect militants moving at night, frequent security sweeps and a campaign of “decapitation strikes” against the group’s leaders.

The authors do not draw conclusions about the group’s future, but suggest that ISIS may be saving its resources until circumstances give it an opportunity to break out.

The group has passed through weak stretches before, the authors note, and has still managed to rebound.

Before it attacked the prison in Hasaka last week, ISIS in Syria was primarily operating in the country’s sparsely populated east, where its fighters sought refuge in the desert to plot attacks on Syrian government and Kurdish-led forces, according to analysts and local residents.

From 2018 to 2021, it stepped up a campaign of assassinations of local leaders and tribal figures, killing more than 200, according to a study by DeirEzzor24, an activist network.

More recently, it has extorted local businesses for cash, spread fliers against the U.S.-backed S.D.F. and carried out a string of attacks on isolated checkpoints that has caused some to be abandoned, said Dareen Khalifa, senior Syria analyst with the International Crisis Group.

“The reality is that it got worse in 2021, not because there were so many attacks on checkpoints, but there were enough attacks to make the internal security forces scared to man checkpoints,” she said.

Other factors have contributed to ISIS’ persistence, she said, citing the S.D.F.’s struggle to forge trusted relations with local residents in overwhelmingly Arab areas, porous borders, crushing poverty that makes it easier for the jihadists to smuggle weapons and people, and the area’s overall instability.

Some sudden disruption, like financial problems for the S.D.F. and its affiliated administration, a new military incursion by Turkey similar to the one in 2019 or a precipitous withdrawal of the 700 U.S. troops based in the area to support the S.D.F., could give the jihadists an opening, Ms. Khalifa said.

“ISIS is a local insurgency, and might not be an imminent transnational risk,” she said. “But if there is a vacuum of some sort in Syria, this is where these movements really thrive. That is when it becomes more of an external threat.”

### ---xt: ISIS IL

#### New Turkish attacks in Syria cause ISIS resurgence

Seldin 5-27-2022, VOA’s National Security Correspondent tracking developments in intelligence, counterterrorism, and cyber since March 2015, following a stint covering the Pentagon. His current focus has been on terror groups such as ISIS and al-Qaida, while also covering U.S. election security, as well as covering developments with Russia, China, North Korea and other global hotspots (Jeff, “US Allies in NE Syria Warn Against New Turkish Incursion,” VoA News, https://www.voanews.com/a/us-allies-in-ne-syria-warn-against-new-turkish-incursion-/6592567.html)//BB

U.S. allies in northeastern Syria are increasingly worried about Turkey’s pledge to launch a new round of military operations in the region, warning it could embolden and even strengthen the Islamic State terror group.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced the new round of operations earlier this week Monday, pledging to expand existing 30-kilometer-deep security zones on the Syrian side of the Turkish border.

But despite assurances from Turkey’s National Security Council that any military actions will “not target our neighbors’ territorial integrity and sovereignty in any way," officials with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces and the SDF’s political wing tell VOA a Turkish incursion could spell disaster.

“Any attempt of invasion will shift the focus of the SDF to fight it since it’s a much higher priority to [defend] your lands than fighting ISIS in non-Kurdish areas,” a source close to SDF leadership said, speaking on the condition of anonymity because the source was not authorized to speak to the media.

“Any Turkish aggression will derail guarding thousands of ISIS captives and the ongoing weekly operations against the terror group in the region,” the source said, using an acronym for the Islamic State group. “The ISIS prisons and camps will be much more vulnerable to jail breaks than now.”

Other Kurdish officials are also voicing concern about the security of the dozen or so prisons across northeastern Syria, currently housing about 10,000 IS fighters, some of which could be in areas that would be targeted by Turkish forces.

"That task (of securing prisons) is not a small one,” Sinam Mohamad, U.S. representative for the SDF’s political wing, the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), told VOA through a spokesperson.

Should Turkey launch military operations in northeastern Syria, “ISIS fighters will be in a more favorable position to be successful in any operations to free those ISIS fighters who have been in prison," Mohamad said.

Other SDC officials warn that IS has been getting stronger, adding it has been just four months since the terror group carried out a week-long attack on the al-Sina’a prison in Hasakah, a makeshift detention facility that housed an estimated 4,000 IS fighters.

Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) patrol a street in the northern Syrian city of Hasakeh, Jan. 23, 2022.

SEE ALSO:

US-Backed SDF Retakes Key Prison in Battle with Islamic State

Already, the SDF has raised concerns about increased drone attacks and shelling by Turkish-backed forces in northern Syria.

And SDC officials say they have been in touch with the United States to express their fears about the potential Turkish incursion, a message that has resonated in Washington.

“We’re obviously very concerned about the Turks announcement that they intend to increase their military activity in northern Syria,” Pentagon press secretary John Kirby told reporters Thursday. “It could draw off potential SDF personnel to move away from the counter-ISIS fight, which is obviously what we're focused on in northern Syria.

Kirby said the Pentagon has been in daily contact with its SDF partners, who echoed that IS remains “a viable threat.”

U.S. diplomatic officials say they have also been in contact with Turkey, both through the State Department and from the U.S. Embassy in Ankara, to get a better sense of what Turkey is planning.

But State Department spokesman Ned Price earlier this week warned Turkey against launching a new round of military operations in northern Syria.

“We condemn any escalation. We support maintenance of the current ceasefire lines,” Price said. “Any new offensive would further undermine regional stability and put at risk U.S. forces in the coalition’s campaign against ISIS.”

## TURKEY-GREECE

### 1NC

#### Emboldenment triggers Turkish aggression against Greece. That escalates

Gingeras 22, professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School and is an expert on Turkish, Balkan, and Middle East history (Ryan, “DOGFIGHT OVER THE AEGEAN: TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONS IN LIGHT OF UKRAINE,” War on the Rocks, <https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/dogfight-over-the-aegean-turkish-greek-relations-in-light-of-ukraine/)//BB>

Making matters worse, Turkey’s current posture toward the Aegean is not solely the product of domestic politics. In assessing the impact the war in Ukraine could have upon Turkish foreign policy, scholar Selim Koru suggested that Erdogan may sense a moment of opportunity to pursue a broad set of revisionist goals in its near abroad. Koru prophesized that, with the backing of right-wing politicians and the country’s security establishment, Ankara “could push more strongly against Greek naval boundaries, which it believes to be unfairly stacked against it.” To some extent, Turkey’s expressions of insecurity echo those of Russia’s in the lead-up to the war with Ukraine. Like the case of Turkish-Greek relations, Russia and Ukraine share a long history of antagonism and disagreement over matters of territory. Like Russian supporters of Putin’s war against Ukraine, prominent voices in Turkey similarly see the Aegean as a potential front in a proxy struggle against the United States. It may be this fear that has led Erdogan’s government to reiterate its threat to “take matters further” in challenging Greek sovereignty in the Aegean. If the current crisis in Ukraine imparts any lesson, it is that one should not underrate the risk of conflict. A war between Greece and Turkey is not only possible but perhaps, at some point, probable.

#### Greece war goes nuclear – accidental and intentional escalation is likely

Psaropoulos 18 (John Psaropoulos, independent journalist based in Athens, with two decades of experience covering Greece, Cyprus and southeast Europe. Freelance correspondent for Al Jazeera International, NPR, the Daily Beast and others; “Greece vs. Turkey: Are We Headed for an Intra-NATO War?”; Washington Examiner; 3/28/18; https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/greece-vs-turkey-are-we-headed-for-an-intra-nato-war kp)

The Aegean Sea between Greece and Turkey hosts one of the world’s highest concentrations of high-tech weaponry. Sixty-seven surface ships and two dozen submarines are deployed on a body of water the size of Lake Superior. The two air forces command 448 fighter jets armed with smart bombs and guided missiles. On land, 832 heavy tanks and more than 2,500 lighter artillery vehicles—as much tank firepower as in all the rest of Europe combined—could rapidly be brought to bear along a Greek-Turkish border only 105 miles long.

These arsenals, built up over decades and constantly modernized, were not merely a boon to U.S. and German defence contractors. Western policymakers wanted to believe that loyalty to NATO’s mission of containing the USSR, rather than regional rivalries, motivated this exemplary level of Greek and Turkish defense spending. After the Soviet Union collapsed, good diplomacy and Turkey’s EU aspirations made it possible, most of the time, to overlook the downsides of an arms race between uneasy neighbors. Recently, however, the Aegean has become a dangerously narrow sea.

For decades, Turkish military aircraft have regularly violated Greece’s 10-mile airspace around its islands, on the grounds that Greece’s territorial waters extend only six nautical miles from shore, and that air and sea borders should match. Turkish ships also ignore the territorial waters around a number of small islands whose Greek ownership Turkey questions. These ships and planes are intercepted by their Greek counterparts, and mock dogfights result. Occasionally fatal accidents occur.

Kostas Grivas, who teaches advanced weapons systems at the Hellenic Army Academy, calls it a “a unique theater of confrontation,” where “land, sea and air forces are simultaneously in use in a very confined area, and there is an enormous amount of weapons systems and men-at-arms in deployment.” In the event of war, he believes, it would be very difficult to maintain command-and-control systems because of the intensity and speed of activity, meaning heavy fratricidal losses. In such chaos, the outcome might ultimately be up to local commanders’ ability to take intelligent initiatives. An Aegean war, Grivas says, would resemble “a mini-nuclear war because there will be so much high-tech ordnance discharged it will cause a huge amount of damage.”

The prospect of such hostilities has been suddenly brought closer this year, following events that are individually and as a series without parallel in recent decades.

Last autumn, Greek foreign minister Nikos Kotzias expressed concern that Turkey had become an “irritable power.” What inspired this concern was a record 3,317 airspace and 1,998 territorial water violations recorded in the Aegean last year—respectively double and quadruple the previous year’s numbers. “Our job is to behave responsibly,” Kotzias declared, so he invited Recep Tayyip Erdogan to become the first Turkish president in six decades to visit Greece.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s December 7 visit was a disaster. On its eve, Erdogan gave an interview calling for revisions of the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. This is the treaty that defines the borders of the modern Turkish state, while guaranteeing the rights of Greek and Muslim minorities in the two countries. It has kept Greece and Turkey at peace for a century and forms the bedrock of their détente. No Greek or Turkish head of state or government had ever publicly called for its revision. Greece’s President Prokopis Pavlopoulos reacted by overstepping his role as ceremonial head of state to lecture Erdogan. Lausanne, he asserted, was “non-negotiable.”

"It has no gaps. It needs neither revision nor updating. It stands as it is, it covers absolutely the issues that it needs to cover, and stresses that among other things it leaves no leeway for gray zones or minority issues," Pavlopoulos said.

Erdogan gave as good as he got. Greece had plunged its Muslim minority into poverty, he said, and is racially prejudiced against it. Erdogan also demanded of Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras the extradition of ten Turkish military officers who fled to Greece after the failed July 2016 coup. The Greek Supreme Court had barred their extradition on the grounds that their lives would be endangered in Turkey. The government cannot overrule the decision and there is no higher court of appeal, but Erdogan insisted: “What I told Mr. Tsipras is that these putschists may be returned to Turkey, a country that has abolished the death penalty, a country where torture does not take place.”

Kotzias’s charm offensive has since collapsed. A planned February revival of the Greek-Turkish Supreme Council, a diplomatic forum, never took place, and a May visit to Athens by the Turkish foreign minister is very much in doubt. But there is worse.

On February 12, a Turkish coast guard vessel rammed a Greek one while performing what the Greek coast guard called “dangerous maneuvers inconsistent with international collision avoidance practices.” Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim called Tsipras to explain that the ramming was accidental; but the fact that it happened near Imia, a pair of Greek islets whose ownership Turkey has disputed for 20 years, suggests to the Greeks a territorial power play.

Turkey upped the ante on the last day of February, arresting two Greek officers who apparently strayed into Turkish territory while on a routine patrol on the Thracian border. The standard practice for both sides during the last three decades has been to return wayward patrols at the nearest checkpoint after a routine procedure. Turkish authorities instead jailed the men and charged them with illegal entry. More serious charges may follow. Greek Defense minister Panos Kammenos refers to the two soldiers as “hostages,” and Greek public opinion takes for granted their seizure as connected with the ten Turkish military fugitives.

Since these incidents, polls say 92 percent of Greeks believe Turkey constitutes Greece’s biggest threat. Is Turkey generating grievances as a pretext for war? Who would gain from such a war? How would America react? And why has Erdogan chosen this moment to escalate tension?

Brinkmanship in 1996: preview of a far worse confrontation?

“What I worry about is the risk of an unintentional confrontation,” says U.S. ambassador to Athens Geoffrey Pyatt. Greece and Turkey nearly did stumble into war two decades ago. On Christmas Day 1995, the Figen Akat, a small Turkish cargo ship, ran aground on the western twin islet of Imia. A Greek tug was dispatched to refloat her, but the Turkish captain refused Greek help, saying he was in Turkish territorial waters. He eventually accepted Greek assistance, but not before the Turkish government had voiced a claim to the Imia islets as Turkish.

In the new year, the mayor of the largest nearby Greek island, Kalymnos, hoisted a Greek flag on Imia. The owners of a newly-licensed Turkish television channel CNN Turk decided to boost ratings by filming two journalists replacing the Greek flag with a Turkish one. Prime Minister Tansu Ciller fueled the fire. “We can’t let a foreign flag fly on Turkish soil. The flag will come down,” she said.

“The Turkish claims have no basis at all. There is no space for negotiations in … matters which concern our sovereignty,” said Greek Premier Kostas Simitis. Greece landed special forces on one of the two islets while Turkish frogmen took the other. As many as 20 Greek and Turkish ships and submarines converged on Imia (or Kardik, as the Turks call it).

On January 31, the United States intervened to avert an unintended war. “In 1996 the Americans stepped in and that sobered both sides,” says retired ambassador Christos Rozakis, one of Greece’s leading experts on international law. “We parted under the understanding, “no ships, no flags,” and reverted to the status quo ante. It wasn’t exactly that, but until the latest incident it was almost that. Greek shepherds didn’t herd their goats there any more, but neither did Turks go there.”

Treaties vs. politics

Imia stands as a textbook case of calculated escalation leading to the brink of an unintended war, and conditions now are even more conducive to such a war than they were in 1996, because new causes of instability have been added to older ones.

### !---Escalates

#### Turkey-Greece war draws-in the US

Ted Galen Carpenter 20, Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute. He received his Ph.D. in U.S. diplomatic history from the University of Texas, “An Old NATO Nightmare Returns: Possible War between Greece and Turkey,” 9/10/20, <https://www.cato.org/blog/old-nato-nightmare-returns-possible-war-between-greece-turkey>

U.S. and other Western leaders have long worried about what to do if an armed conflict ever erupted between two NATO members. Rapidly rising tensions between Greece and Turkey, primarily involving a maritime dispute over oil, natural gas, and other resources under the eastern Mediterranean, have brought that nightmare to the surface once again. Germany’s Foreign Minister, Heiko Maas, warned both governments in late August against further military escalation. “Fire is being played with and any small spark could lead to catastrophe,” he stressed. The heart of the North Atlantic Treaty is Article 5, which proclaims that an attack on any member of the Alliance will be considered an attack on all. The underlying assumption is that there would then be a collective response to repel and punish the aggressor. Obviously, that approach would not work if two NATO signatories went to war against each other. Even determining which country was the aggressor and which the victim could be quite challenging. Throughout NATO’s history, the greatest risk of an intra‐​alliance conflict has always been one involving Greece and Turkey. Although both countries joined NATO in 1952, mutual membership in that security partnership did not erase the centuries of animosity between the two populations. Athens and Ankara have nearly come to blows on several occasions, most notably when Turkey invaded majority‐​Greek Cyprus in 1974, proceeded to occupy nearly 40 percent of the island, and expelled Greek Cypriots from that territory. The occupation continues to this day. There have been several lesser, but still worrisome, incidents over the years. Among other problems, Turkish military planes continuously violate Greek airspace. Athens then sends its fighter planes up to intercept and challenge the Turkish aircraft—in some years as many as 2,000 times. Thus far, there have been no armed clashes, but as I’ve written elsewhere, similar games of aerial “chicken” involving the United States and such countries as Russia and China are extremely reckless. One such episode between U.S. and Chinese planes in 2001 resulted in a midair collision that killed the Chinese pilot and created an ugly diplomatic row between Washington and Beijing. All it would take is one miscalculation by a Greek or Turkish pilot to trigger a similar (or worse) crisis between Athens and Ankara. The Cyprus episode suggests what Washington’s reaction would be to the outbreak of a Greco‐​Turkish armed conflict. Under the guidance of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the United States pressured both countries to dampen their quarrel, and Kissinger used maximum leverage to get the other NATO members to adopt the same position. However, Kissinger’s stance was far from neutral. Even though Turkey had been the aggressor, the [US] United States soon tilted in favor of Ankara’s position. Congressional anger compelled Gerald Ford’s administration to implement sanctions against the Turkish government, but the White House moved inexorably to dilute those measures as quickly as possible. That approach continued under Jimmy Carter’s administration, and by the beginning of the 1980s, the restrictions were effectively moot. Washington’s response reflected the belief that Turkey was a much more important ally than Greece in terms of strategic considerations. There is little reason to believe that the U.S. attitude has changed. Even if a Biden administration would not share Donald Trump’s apparent admiration for Turkey’s autocratic president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, both security and economic calculations would push Washington toward that conclusion. There is one important difference, though, between the Cyprus crisis and a possible new confrontation between Athens and Ankara. Key NATO powers, most notably France and Italy, are not happy about Erdogan’s increasingly undemocratic rule and his government’s maverick, often pro‐​Russian, behavior on security issues. In addition, France has openly challenged Turkey’s territorial and resource claims in the eastern Mediterranean, and in late August, French warships and planes joined a joint military exercise with Greece and Cyprus to convey a blunt message of displeasure to Ankara. Washington may find it far more difficult today to drag its NATO allies into taking a pro‐​Turkish stance in case of an armed confrontation between Greece and Turkey than it did in 1974. The mere prospect of a possible Greco‐​Turkish war underscores one of the major drawbacks of the United States being the leader of a nearly 30‐​member military alliance. America automatically is entangled in the grievances and quarrels of every one of those members. And when two members openly hate each other, that situation can create not only a headache but an outright nightmare for the United States.

#### Turkey-Greece war escalates and the US gets drawn-in

Stratfor 20, Shadow CIA, iykyk, “What's Driving Turkish Aggression in the Mediterranean Sea,” 9/9/20, <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/whats-driving-turkish-aggression-mediterranean-sea>

Turkey is putting its 50-year view on maritime rights into practice through its Blue Homeland Doctrine, growing its naval and commercial presence in Mediterranean waters that it claims are part of its exclusive economic zones (EEZs). Oil and gas exploration is becoming a crucial tool in implementing this strategy. But Ankara's attempts to claim extensive maritime resource rights risk broadening to a wider conflict with Greece and other NATO allies that would bring foreign energy projects, and potentially the United States, into the fray. Turkey's Maritime Ambitions Turkey claims that all of its neighboring waters in the Aegean, Black and Mediterranean seas deserve special treatment under international law, and that the islands in the Aegean Sea (which Greece controls the majority of) should not enjoy the same rights as large countries like Turkey with lengthy coastlines. The international community never adopted these distinctions, which is why Turkey is not a signatory to the United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and prefers to resolve disputes through bilateral negotiations in lieu of not international arbitration. This has so far led to two major disputes with Greece in the Aegean and Mediterranean seas, as well as a major dispute with Cyprus in the eastern Mediterranean. Turkey's most important dispute is in the Aegean Sea, where thousands of Greek islands help boost Greece's maritime claims over Turkey's, and where the two countries disagree on how to even start drawing a maritime border due to the disparity in the number of islands between them. Turkey has just three islands in the Aegean Sea, while Greece claims more than 3,000. Given the higher number of Greek islands, Turkey has long maintained that any expansion of Greek maritime claims from six nautical miles (nm) to 12 nm off Greece's shores would constitute a "casus belli," or cause of war. While Greece and Turkey have nearly gone to war several times over disputes in the Aegean Sea, the two countries have so far avoided declaring full EEZs in the region, as well as claiming territorial waters beyond six nautical miles. But that doesn't mean they can't do so in the future. Ankara has argued that if both Greece and Turkey extended their claims beyond 12 nm, Turkey's percent ownership of the territory would only marginally increase, while Greece would see its territorial control reach nearly three-quarters of the entire Aegean Sea. The use of Greece's islands in the Aegean Sea to demarcate a maritime border for EEZs, which extend up to 200 nm from the coast, would also leave Turkey with virtually no rights to the natural resources and fisheries in the Aegean Sea. Turkey has argued that a more equitable way to split the sea's resources would be by ignoring the islands altogether and starting off with an equidistant line between the Greek and Turkish mainlands. Ankara Takes Action By more aggressively flexing its claims through energy exploration and naval exercises in the eastern Mediterranean, Turkey is trying to both legitimize its declared EEZ claim, as well as delegitimize any potential EEZ claims in the region that Greece has through its islands of Crete, Rhodes and Kastellorizo. Kastellorizo, in particular, has the potential to generate a significant EEZ claim for Greece that could connect to Cyprus's own claimed EEZ, thus significantly limiting Turkish claims to resources between Crete and Cyprus. Further escalation could result in Greece finally claiming its full EEZ in the eastern Mediterranean, which Athens has so far been reluctant to do for fear of spurring a wider conflict. Protected by a Turkish naval convoy, Turkey's Oruc Reis surveying vessel has been active throughout the Mediterranean Sea since the beginning of the year. Turkey's December 2019 maritime agreement with Libya's Government of National Accord aims to legitimize Turkey's claims by establishing a border between Turkish and Libyan waters that ignores Crete and Kastellorizo. On Aug. 27, the Greek parliament ratified a maritime border agreement with Egypt aimed at countering Turkey's pact with Libya by legitimizing a potential EEZ border generated via its control of Crete with Egypt. Greece's deal with Egypt is a first step in potentially declaring a full EEZ in the eastern Mediterranean, but the agreement with Egypt does not legitimize potential claims that Kastellorizo could give Greece rights to. Turkey has also been actively attempting to delegitimize Cyprus' claimed EEZ in the eastern Mediterranean by both conducting energy exploration in waters that Cyprus directly claims, as well as harassing foreign companies that are operating on behalf of the Cypriot government. Turkey has argued that Cyprus' claimed EEZ is not legal because it was not done in coordination with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which Ankara recognizes as a legitimate government for all of Cyprus. Turkey also argues that, as an island, Cyprus cannot claim a full EEZ. Turkey's Yavuz vessel is currently drilling off the coast of Western Cyprus. Turkey's Barbados vessel is also currently researching in the Northern Cyprus territorial waters that Turkey recognizes as a part of an oil exploration block held by the state-owned Turkish Petroleum Corporation. In 2018, the Turkish navy prevented the Italian oil firm Eni from drilling on its Cuttlefish prospect in an exploration block the company received from Cyprus. The Specter of War Turkey's increased provocations will continue to drive the United States and other NATO countries, including France and Greece, to boost their own naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean. Both Turkey and Greece will try to refrain from crossing red lines that could spur a larger confrontation that neither wants, but the higher presence of ships in the eastern Mediterranean will nonetheless increase the possibility of incidents, as evidenced by the Aug. 10 collision between the Greek frigate Limnos and the Turkish frigate Kemal Reis. International mediation would likely avoid further escalation to a military conflict between Greece and Turkey, but is unlikely to result in a diplomatic solution to their dispute. In the case of a wider crisis, most NATO members would view Turkey as the aggressor and would likely back Greece. This would likely reinforce Ankara's overall pursuit of its maritime strategy and intensifying national security push by offering Turkey further proof that NATO does not prioritize its national security priorities. Countries can only leave NATO on their own accord, which Turkey remains is unlikely to do. Instead, Ankara would probably continue to reduce collaboration with NATO countries. Despite Cyprus and Greece's calls for a more significant response to deter Turkey's behavior, the European Union will likely be hesitant to impose more drastic measures for fear of prompting Ankara to reduce cooperation on migration and other EU priorities. Unless Turkey starts to more directly protect its claims in the Aegean Sea, fires upon a Greek or another European vessel, or conducts drilling or exploration activities around Crete, Brussels will likely limit its sanctions pressure to companies and individuals supporting Turkish activities in the Mediterranean. Decisions on implementing EU sanctions require unanimity among the bloc's member states. And some countries, such as Germany, are more concerned about aggressive sanctions only inflaming Brussels' tensions with Turkey. If the European Union does not take significant action on Turkey, Cyprus is now threatening to veto proposed EU sanctions against Belarus amid the country's ongoing political crisis. This may result in slightly stronger EU sanctions that target more Turkish individuals and companies, but more broad-based economic sanctions against the Turkish government remain unlikely. Energy Projects in the Crossfire The United States will likely let the European Union continue to take the lead in responding to Turkey's attempts to delegitimize Greek and Cypriot maritime claims, but Chevron's recent entry into the eastern Mediterranean could eventually draw Washington more directly into the conflict. On July 20, Chevron announced an agreement to acquire the Houston-based oil and gas firm Noble Energy, which operates both the Leviathan gas field off the coast of Israel and the Aphrodite gas field off the coast of Cyprus. Ankara, however, will likely adopt a more hands-off approach to U.S. companies operating in the region, as the United States would be more willing to impose hardline sanctions in response to American firms being drawn into its maritime disputes. By continuing to increase the cost of developing resources in Cypriot waters, Turkey's ongoing harassment of foreign energy firms will drive its neighbors closer together on both maritime security and energy exploration issues. But it could also potentially halt their construction of the proposed East Med pipeline. Cyprus, Egypt, Greece and Israel created the East Mediterranean Gas Forum in 2019. The quartet has since collaborated to construct the roughly $6 billion pipeline project, which would carry natural gas from the eastern Mediterranean to Europe. Under international law, Turkey is technically required to allow other countries to build pipelines through its EEZ. But Ankara retains the power to demand that any constructors of the East Med pipeline adhere to its environmental reviews and oversight, which would be de facto recognition of Turkey's EEZ. Otherwise, Turkey could send its navy to harass or intercept vessels involved with construction as Ankara did in 2018 with a drillship planning to spud a well in Cypriot waters.

### !---Turns Case

#### Greece-Turkey war decimates NATO

Salacanin 20 — Stasa Salacanin, Author for Inside Arabia. 10/21/2020. “NATO’s Dilemma Over Greece-Turkey Friction”, Inside Arabia, https://insidearabia.com/natos-dilemma-over-greece-turkey-friction/ WMK

Tensions between Turkey and Greece have increased after a series of disputes over the interpretation of international maritime law and territorial waters in the Eastern Mediterranean, where rich gas deposits have been found. Last month, Greek and Turkish military ships collided in contested waters near the Greek island of Kastellorizo, which lies just 2 km (1.2 miles) from the Turkish coast. Turkish military vessels guarded the country’s seismic research ship. This flexing of military muscles has raised concerns of confrontation between the two NATO members, who share a long history of disputes.

In short, while Greece has insisted that a country’s continental shelf should be measured from islands that belong to a particular state – an interpretation that has been supported by the UN Law of the Sea –Turkey builds its case by claiming that a nation’s continental shelf should be measured from its mainland coast.

Turkey’s exploration of the Mediterranean for hydrocarbons has pushed it at loggerheads over energy resources with many other countries in the region. Ankara has been criticized for its foreign and security policies, which have often been seen as incompatible with the interests of NATO members. Many analysts suggest that one of the main causes for the current discord with Turkey lies in Ankara’s implementation of the Blue Homeland Doctrine developed over 15 years ago, that seeks to expand Turkey’s influence in the Mediterranean as well as the Black Sea, and to exploit energy and other resources.

The disagreement grew when Greece signed a maritime deal with Egypt in August, to counter Ankara’s agreement with the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord, which defines the maritime border between Turkey and Libya, and permits Turkey to jointly exploit energy sources in the Mediterranean. The accord has triggered a series of incidents in the Mediterranean, adding to the list of Turkey’s unilateral moves in Syria and Libya as well as the decision to buy Russian S-400, and pushing Ankara in serious odds with NATO and the EU.

NATO has tried to de-escalate the situation. Its Chief, Jens Stoltenberg, encouraged the Greek and Turkish sides to engage in dialogue, along with Germany and the US—two influential NATO members seeking to take a mediator role in the dispute. The EU, however, explicitly threatened Turkey with sanctions if it continues with its unilateral drilling activities and aggressive moves.

Although NATO has never been designed to adjudicate disputes between its members, the alliance has developed some basic deconfliction arrangements, such as minimum distances between aircrafts and ships and the establishment of hotlines.

The later has been set up as a military mechanism to prevent serious clashes following talks between Turkey and Greece at the NATO headquarters in Brussels. The hotline will enable direct communication between the two sides, similar to one that was installed during the Cold War between Moscow and Washington.

While current initiatives may calm the brewing tension in the short run, it is obvious that NATO faces much deeper dilemmas, which seriously undermine its cohesion.

According to Barah Mikaïl, Founding Director of Stractegia – a Madrid-based consultancy specializing in Middle Eastern geopolitics, this is why NATO’s Secretary-General is trying to mediate between the two countries. “NATO – and most of its members – know that they need to calm things down if they want to maintain NATO’s image of cohesion. They also know that Turkey is an important military, geographic, and strategic partner, and that if they don’t handle all this with care, they could be facing a fierce and aggressive reaction from Turkey,” he told Inside Arabia.

It seems that Turkey is trying to write a new set of rules while testing the patience of the alliance, knowing that it is an important geostrategic member of NATO. On the other hand, Tarik Basbugoglu, a PhD candidate at Glasgow Caledonian University in Scotland and an expert on Turkey’s foreign policy, explained that although Turkey does not want to leave NATO, it has been disappointed over the lack of understanding and solidarity it received regarding the Gulenist military coup, Turkish military operations in Syria against Syrian Kurds, and Turkish policy in the broader MENA region.

In Mikaïl’s view, Turkey is trying to get the maximum benefit before it takes a break and considers negotiations, recognizing that it is in a position of power. “It did so in Libya; it tried to do so in Syria; it is pushing in the same way on Nagorno Karabakh—of course, Ankara/Erdogan could always push things beyond some red lines and create a risk zone, but Turks also know where to stop,” Mikaïl explained. “And they know how to pressure NATO in order to get what they want, and to make themselves feared and taken [seriously],” he added.

Nevertheless, it seems that NATO has become ~~paralyzed~~ [immobilized] over the Turkey-Greece issue—two nominal allies that have never been very friendly.

Basbugoglu observes that although the Trump administration seemed to be neutral towards the recent Turkish-Greek tensions, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo went to Cyprus and Greece to calm down both sides. He recalls that Pompeo warned the Turkish government to not escalate the friction by sending the Oruc Reis survey vessel to the East Mediterranean during his Cyprus visit.

Yet, Basbugoglu noted, the US Embassy in Turkey expressed its support to Ankara by saying that the US did not accept the Sevilla map which increases the maritime border zones of Greece. Therefore, according to Basbugoglu, “the Trump leadership sought to play a constructive role in decreasing the tensions in the East Mediterranean.”

However, in Mikaïl’s opinion, it is impossible to broker between Greece and Turkey without taking sides, as their demands are diametrically opposed. “This is why an ‘external’ mediation may be needed, but there is not much NATO can do since it also cares about keeping in its ranks a country [Turkey] that is essential for both its military and geographic projection – especially towards Russia, the endless raison d’être for NATO,” he added.

Moreover, by being overly obsessed with Russia and focusing primarily on its eastern flank, NATO has long neglected its southern flank that is highly vulnerable and exposed to the destructive impact of Middle Eastern conflicts and growing tensions among its members.

Furthermore, in the absence of firm leadership, NATO has not been able to respond to the particular interests of some of its larger members. Thus countries like Turkey often pursued their own geopolitical tactics which collided with the aims of other members of the alliance, causing frictions that seriously undermine the stability and very foundation of the organization.

## PROLIFERATION

### 1NC

#### US security cooperation emboldens Turkish proliferation---only the CP tames Turkish ambitions for nukes.

Konstantinos Apostolou-Katsaros 21. special analyst- consultant. Ph.D. and M.Sc. from the School of Environment and Technology of Brighton University (UK) where he worked as a Lecturer and Research Associate, “Turkey's Nuclear Dreams Are A Nightmare for The International Community”, Greek City Times,9-13-2021, https://greekcitytimes.com/2021/09/13/turkeys-nuclear-dreams-are-a-nightmare-for-the-international-community///SJ

Drifting apart from the West

Nonetheless, Turkey’s eagerness to embark on a nuclear-weapons program should be seen in the bigger context. There are clear indications that the Eurasianist ideology creeps in Turkey’s top-ranking policymakers. Analysts identify this ideology as a Turkish version of the Ba’athism in the Arab world. The Eurasianists argue that Turkey’s interests lie outside the Western world and therefore should join the “anti-imperialist” camp led by Russia and China.

When speaking about Afghanistan, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said: “Imperial powers entered Afghanistan; they have been there for over 20 years. We also stood by our Afghan brothers against all imperial powers.” A similar statement made by the Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan, revealed the common grounds of the two Sunni forces in their ideological (and religious) beliefs. He said that the Taliban are “breaking the chains of slavery.” Some would argue that both statesmen are influenced by the jihad theorist Sayyid Qutb (author of the influential book “Milestones”) and his idea of victimization of Muslims by foreigners or “imperialists”. He believed that western nations are attempting to undermine Islamic empowerment thus jihad is the tool to liberate the “suppressed” Muslims from the “imperial powers” (see also 1 , 2 , 3).

Conclusions

It is evident that the alleged new venture of Turkey in the nuclear weapons field is in all cases a cause of serious concern for its Western allies. Its decision to drift away (1 and 2) from the North Atlantic alliance and become a strategically autonomous Eurasianist power, presupposes the acquisition of a nuclear arsenal. This will lead to a reflexive nuclear arms race of key states in the wider sensitive region, hindering the already fragile balances and undermining the existing Euro-Atlantic security architecture. Such prospect cannot be reversed by false hopes on a softer policy after a leadership change in the Turkish elections of 2023, or worst by transactionalism that will boost Turkey’s confidence. It is arguable that Turkey’s overambitious geopolitical balancing act is pushing the limits of its diplomatic, economic and military capabilities. Therefore restraining its activities in these fields (especially its military hardware / technology as well as the space, missile and nuclear programs) by the states affected most and the US, is most likely to weaken its eagerness and tame its revisionist goals.

#### Turkish prolif goes nuclear.

Matthew **Kroenig and** Rebecca Davis **Gibbons 16**. Matthew Kroenig is an Associate Professor in the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service and a Senior Fellow at the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security. Rebecca Davis Gibbons is a Visiting Assistant Professor in the Department of Government at Bowdoin College. “Chapter 5The Next Nuclear War”. Should We Let the Bomb Spread http://npolicy.org/books/Should\_We\_Let\_the\_Bomb\_Spread/Full\_Book.pdf//SJ

Iran’s nuclear program is at least temporarily halted under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action struck with the international community in 2015. But if the limits in this deal were contravened for any reason, it is possible that Iran could still join the nuclear club. If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, it is also possible that other states in the region, including Turkey, Egypt, or Saudi Arabia could attempt to acquire nuclear weapons in response.88 While fears of a rapid and complete nuclear cascade in the region are probably overblown, it is possible, if not likely, that one or two additional states would join the nuclear club within the course of several decades if Iran goes nuclear.89

The nuclear balance of power between Iran and its neighbors could be highly unstable and would likely lack many of the safeguards that existed between the superpowers during the Cold War, including: the absenceof a direct line ofcommunication between Iran and its rivals, short timelinesfor nuclear-armed missiles to travel between states, the lack of secure second-strikecapabilities (at least initially), and, in Israel, a lack of strategic depth and a strategic culture that emphasizes preemption.

Iran and Israel have viewed each other as strategic competitors since the Iranian Revolution in 1979; Israel has directly come into conflict with Iran’s proxies, Hezbollah and Hamas. Iran has also frequently clashed with Israel’s superpower patron, the United States. In 1988, the United States and Iran engaged in a major naval battle as part of the Tanker War, the U.S. Navy’s largest engagement since the end of World War II. Iran sponsored proxy attacks that killed U.S. service personnel for a decade in Iraq and Afghanistan. And Tehran and Washington frequently exchange threats and counter-threats in the Persian Gulf and over the Strait of Hormuz.90 It is, therefore, conceivable that a future conflict involving a nuclear-armed Iran and Israel or the United States could result in a nuclear exchange. If other states in the region, such as Turkey or Saudi Arabia, also acquired nuclear weapons, the nuclear balance would be even less stable and a poly-nuclear Middle East might be the most likely candidate for the next nuclear war.

### U---No Prolif Now

#### Turkey’s focusing on non-nuclear ballistic missile capabilities.

Can Kasapoğlu 19, IPC-Stiftung Mercator Fellow at the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS), “Turkey’s Nuclear Onset: Military Policy, Techno-Nationalism Trends and Defense Industrial Capabilities”, October 2019, <https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/turkeys-nuclear-onset///SJ>

Turkey’s ballistic missile program remains solely conventional

A closer look at Turkey’s ballistic missile program gives a hint as to Ankara’s most probable motives with regard to its nuclear rhetoric.

The Bora line forms the core of Turkey’s missile program. The line can be traced back to Ankara’s initial defense cooperation with Beijing in the late 1990s. Based on the Chinese B-611 tactical ballistic missile as a baseline, Turkey has made significant progress, especially in developing the mis­sile’s accuracy. Bora is a road-mobile missile that carries a 480 kg high-explosive war­head, has an operational range of around 280 km and is reported to have a CEP (cir­cular error probable) of 50 meters. Notably, ROKETSAN, the primary manufacturer of the weapon system, claims Bora’s CEP is as small as 10 meters or even less. If true, this would make the missile one of the most precise in its class.

Bora saw its combat debut in May 2019 during Operation Claw in Northern Iraq. Its maiden operational launch was widely publicized in the Turkish press, showcasing yet another milestone for Turkey’s burgeon­ing defense industries. After all, a road-mobile (enables better survivability on the battleground), solid-fuel (minimizes the launch-cycle, supporting launch at short notice) tactical ballistic missile, carrying half a ton of high-explosive warhead with precision strike capability within 280 kilometers represents a game-changer for Turkish military operations. Now, Ankara must walk a fine line in missile proliferation, as Turkey is a party to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR, a non-binding yet effective exports control regime focusing on systems able to deliver at least 500 kg payload to 300 km and beyond). The Bora line’s further roadmap remains a critical issue. In this matter, only limited open-source input is available. In 2018, the Turkish defense minister spoke of a second batch, Bora 2, without detailing the admin­istration’s plans for areas of improvement. Notably, back in 2012, the Turkish press reported that then Prime Minister Erdoğan had set the bar high for the country’s national research and development efforts and had called on the industry to produce missiles with a range of around 2,500 km, probably with the Middle Eastern military strategic balance in mind.

Technically, unless Ankara opts for adding another stage to Bora, which would mark a burdensome difficulty in terms of know-how and defense economics, it would be safe to assume that the Bora family will remain a short-range system (meaning an operational range of less than 1,000 km). In comparison, Iran’s Sejjil 2 solid-fuel bal­listic missile, for example, has a two-stage design (independent rocket stages with engine and propellant), setting its operational range at around 2,000 km which places it in the medium-range ballistic missile category (operational range between 1,000 km and 3,000 km). An educated guess suggests that Turkey would focus on minimizing the launch-cycle and boosting their precision and maneuverability (new gen­eration ballistic missiles, such as the Rus­sian SS‑26 Iskander, can follow unpredictable trajectories and homing maneuvers to strengthen missile defense). Another area of improvement might be to reduce the radar cross-section of Bora by altering its design to prevent it being easily detected by early warning systems. Although such modernization packages might furnish the Turkish Armed Forces with an even more lethal battlefield asset, it would not hint at a program to produce delivery means for nuclear payloads, as there is no visible work on nuclear warhead design, no hint that the Bora line will be adjusted for WMD delivery and, so far, no effort to develop an airburst mode warhead detonation during the tests (airburst above ground level is pre­ferred in ballistic missiles used in WMD dissemination).

In fact, considering the anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) zones surrounding Turkey, which pose an immense threat to manned aircraft, Ankara’s decision to invest in high-precision ballistic missile capabilities for conventional roles, coupled with unmanned aerial platforms with higher payloads, makes perfect sense.

#### Conventional modernization now

Can Kasapoğlu 19, IPC-Stiftung Mercator Fellow at the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS), “Turkey’s Nuclear Onset: Military Policy, Techno-Nationalism Trends and Defense Industrial Capabilities”, October 2019, https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/turkeys-nuclear-onset///SJ

Turkey’s roadmap for defense modernization is expected to remain on track and pursue further progress on items that have been in the limelight, such as unmanned systems, blue-water naval capabilities, strategic air and missile defense and smart conventional weaponry across the spectrum. Tactical aviation and Turkey’s upgrade to fifth-generation systems looms large as the biggest unknown, revolving around the F-35 issue, Russia’s charm offensives and the national combat aircraft project (Milli Muharip Uçak – MMU). The ballistic missile program will likely be limited to the short range (< 1,000 km) in the foreseeable future, focusing on producing tactical assets for battlefield use. Turkey can further advance its GEZGIN cruise missile project and reach a range of beyond 1,000 km. However, the GEZGIN project is designed to develop conventional long-range strike capabilities for naval platforms, mimicking the US Tomahawk and Russian Kalibr missiles.

### U---AT: Erdogan Rhetoric

#### Erdogan uses nuclear rhetoric to signal regional ambitions which proves the direction of the internal link.

Kushal Agrawal 22, Research Assistant at Indian Pugwash Society, “Erdogan’s Nuclear Rhetoric”, IDSA,6-1-2022, https://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/erdogan-nuclear-rhetoric-kagrawal-010622//SJ

Erdogan’s Geo-political Ambitions

Turkey under Erdogan has been pushing for an aggressive power projection that is not just limited to its neighborhood. Turkey’s threat perception and the use of military force was limited till the 2010s as their primary threat was the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) insurgency, a conflict brewing for more than four decades. The Turkish establishment’s approach towards the PKK militancy outside of Turkey was defensive in nature but post the 2015 breakdown of the negotiations with the PKK, Turkey has been going on an offensive with strikes in Iraqi Kurdistan and involvement in Syria.13 Being part of the NATO bloc helped Turkey allay its fears against Moscow and other regional powers.

With the rise of an Islamist Erdogan and the fall of the old Kemalist order, Turkey’s regional ambitions began to rise with the state’s involvement in regional conflicts like Syria and Libya. As Erdogan’s involvement in the region increases, any rhetoric about build-up in terms of armaments, whether nuclear or otherwise, only helps him in sending a strong message to its neighbors.

Also, Erdogan has been highlighting Turkey as the leader of the Muslim Ummah and the one who stands up in defense of every Islamic cause. Since the Saudis are increasingly seen to be very passive on the issues of Israel–Palestine, Pakistan–India and many other such emotive Islamic causes, its leadership role of the predominantly Sunni Islamic countries has been dwindling. This has created a vacuum that Erdogan is trying to fill by raising his pitch for the leadership of the Islamic Ummah.

In the September 2019 UN General Assembly speech where Erdogan spoke about nuclear discrimination, he incessantly spoke at length about the problems the Muslim world is facing. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the only nuclear armed state in the entire Muslim world also raises such issues time and again but is seen as a body politic ridden with political instability, internal insurgencies, and a state which is beholden to the Arabs for support on various issues, especially on its economy.

Turkey on the other hand is a large economic and a major military power in the Islamic world. It also has a rich Islamic historical past, perhaps the longest running Caliphate in the history of Islam and is now repositioning itself as a big power in the whole of West Asia and North Africa region. By painting Turkey as a victim of nuclear discrimination and raising the rhetoric for it on international platforms, Erdogan hopes to garner popularity within the West Asia and North Africa (WANA) region and also in the larger Islamic world.

Although Turkey hosts NATO nuclear weapons at its Incirlik Air base, the Western powers have always had a passive response towards Turkey’s external and internal threat perceptions. Whether in Syria or the PKK or on Greco-Turkish maritime disputes, the West has largely been on the opposite side of Turkey’s interests.14 The European Union has also repeatedly shown its disinterest in including Turkey in the grouping.15 This ‘blaming the West’ helps Erdogan domestically and in the larger Muslim world. Using the nuclear rhetoric, especially at the backdrop of raising Islamic issues whether at home or abroad, further buttresses Erdogan’s popularity. After his September 2019 UN speech, Erdogan got a lot of appreciation from countries like Pakistan, which are hotbeds of Islamic fundamentalism.16

Nuclear Messaging

US–Turkey relations have been dwindling, especially since the July 2016 unsuccessful coup allegedly by Islamic Preacher Fetullah Gulen who Turkey declared a terrorist and resident in the US. Turkey has since developed closer defense and security ties with Russia and China. It acquired the Russian S-400 air defense system after which the US administration formally excluded Turkey from the F-35 program and cancelled deliveries of the fighter jet. Turkey has since been sanctioned by the US under Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) in December 2020.17

US and Turkey have also had diverging interests in the Mediterranean Region. With the ongoing Greco-Turkish maritime dispute in the Eastern Mediterranean waters, Turkey has been critical of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, officially formed in September 2020 by Greece, Israel, Italy, Greek Cypriot administration, Palestinian National Authority, Jordan and Egypt with the US and the European Union as Permanent Observers. This was seen by Turkey as a snub on its energy rights over the Eastern Mediterranean waters.

The Biden administration recognized the Armenian Medz Yeghern (genocide) just months after the Nagorno-Karabakh war, in which Azerbaijan defeated Armenia with the help of Turkey.18 With this growing bitterness in ties, Erdogan through his nuclearization rhetoric may want to send a message that just because Turkey is protected by NATO’s nuclear umbrella, it will not be a subservient partner to the West.

The nuclear rhetoric is not necessarily aimed at the West but should also be seen as indirectly conveying a message to Russia. The Turkish establishment has been moving towards strategic autonomy, as it has diverging interests with both the Western world and Russia. Russia’s and Turkey’s position on Syria are antithetical to each other. Also, amidst the whole Russia–Ukraine ongoing conflict, Turkey has been one of the most reliable defence partners of Kyiv, which has angered Moscow.19

This muscle flexing also helps Erdogan domestically at a time when his economic handling has come under criticism. Any such bravado abroad helps Erdogan boost his image in the domestic constituency and to pivot away from problems back home. As issues on the economic and political front escalate, there is a high chance that Erdogan might increasingly indulge in such a rhetoric more so before the 2023 Turkish general elections.

Conclusion

Erdogan’s statements on nuclear weapons could be nothing more than his efforts to showcase Turkey as a major power in the Islamic world. Despite such rhetoric, though, Turkey is more isolated regionally now. Turkey has strained relations with the US and Europe. Erdogan in recent times, though, has given indications of reconciliation with Israel. Russia has emerged as its main partner for air defence needs as well as for its civil nuclear energy programmes. Erdogan has had to dial down on the Ummah rhetoric internationally. With US shifting its focus to China, Turkey may want to flex its muscle in the region and such nuclear rhetoric can be useful in signalling Turkey’s regional intentions. It remains to be seen how Erdogan manages Turkey’s conflicting relationships, regionally, as well as with NATO and Russia, in pursuit of his country’s geo-political ambitions.

### Prolif---Internal---2NC

AFF causes Turkish prolif:

1. EMBOLDENMENT

[1NC Card]

#### 2. MILITARY INVESTMENTS

#### NATO security cooperation helps Erdogan invest into his defense industrial base, creating nuclear capabilities.

Eric Brewer et al. 20, Deputy Director and Senior Fellow with the Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Ilan Goldenberg is a Senior Fellow and Director, Middle East Security Program, Center for a New American Security. Joseph Rodgers is a Program Coordinator, Project on Nuclear Issues, Center for Strategic and International Studies. Maxwell Simon is a Program Coordinator and Research Assistant, Project on Nuclear Issues, Center for Strategic and International Studies. Kaleigh Thomas is a Research Associate, Middle East Security Program, Center for a New American Security., “Toward a More Proliferated World?; The Geopolitical Forces that Will Shape the Spread of Nuclear Weapons”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 2020, http://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/200902\_Toward\_a\_More\_Proliferated\_World.pdf//SJ

7. Shifting global dynamics due to strategic competition

Despite its NATO membership, Turkey is hedging its bets and diversifying its partners, to include growing cooperation with Russia. As strategic competition between the United States (and by extension, NATO) and Russia and China heats up, it is unclear how long Turkey’s strategy can last. Russia is not a feasible or desirable replacement for NATO and the U.S. nuclear guarantee, but so far Turkey is in effect taking steps that make practical elements of its NATO partnership untenable and a danger to the alliance. If Turkey concludes that its strategic interests and vision no longer align with the United States and NATO, but it has few other alternatives, that could serve as a powerful driver for consideration of a nuclear weapons program. Competition dynamics could influence Turkish choices in the civil nuclear arena as well. Much like Turkey’s take on the S-400 purchase—and similar to Saudi Arabia’s approach to selecting its nuclear power supplier—the 123 renegotiations with the United States could quickly become subsumed under geopolitics. Erdogan no doubt understands that the United States increasingly views its civil nuclear energy through the lens of strategic competition, and such negotiation would be an opportunity to signal and exercise Turkey’s strategy of decreasing its reliance on the United States.

WHAT TO WATCH FOR

The future of Turkey’s civil nuclear energy program. Turkey seems poised to finally get its nuclear energy program off the ground.128 Turkey has no current need for enrichment or reprocessing capabilities. Thus, it will be telling whether Turkey protests any U.S. asks that Turkey commit not to engage in such activities during renegotiation of the U.S.-Turkey 123 agreement (which expires in 2023), and if so, what justification it provides.129

Iran’s nuclear status. If Iran leaves the NPT, produces nuclear weapons, or is believed to be close to having them, this would likely lead Turkey to consider whether it too needs to begin a nuclear weapons program.

Additional investment in domestic defense capabilities and diversification of defense partners. Increasing longstanding Turkish investment its own defense industrial base—including its missile program or nascent satellite launch and space efforts—could serve to both reduce its reliance on the United States and NATO and contribute to advancing a potential nuclear weapons delivery capability (which might be an indicator Turkey was pursuing a hedging strategy).

#### 3. RUSSIAN SHELTERING

#### Western appeasement pushes Turkey deeper into a Russian military alliance.

Burak Bekdil 22, Ankara-based political analyst and a fellow at the Middle East Forum., “Erdoğan Must Be Opposed, not Appeased”, Middle East Forum,5-26-2022, https://www.meforum.org/63261/erdogan-must-be-opposed-not-appeased//SJ

‘The West's appeasement will, unfortunately, only embolden Erdoğan and push him further into the Russian orbit, both politically as a covert ally and militarily as a client of critical weapons systems. Erdoğan has long been playing the old oriental carpet-selling game: pitting potential buyers against each other to get the best price -- Turkey is hoping to be sold to the highest bidder.

The West's appeasement will just further embolden Erdoğan to keep blackmailing it: If you do not sell me F-35s or F-16s, I will buy fighter jets from Russia. Erdoğan then turns to Putin: I am your man in NATO. If you do not want me to be a real NATO ally, you must give me something. Erdoğan's double-play has to be stopped. For that, is needed a determined Western bloc who will remind him that he will not get what he wants from his (theoretical) allies in the West by blackmailing them

#### **That creates shelter for proliferation.**

Vipin Narang 22. Frank Stanton Professor of Nuclear Security and Political Science and a member of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Ph.D. from the Department of Government at Harvard, “Seeking the Bomb”, Princeton University Press, 01-08-2022, Vol. 188, p. 292-337, Project Muse //SJ

How does one stop sheltered pursuers? Major powers make a decision to extend shelter, pricing in the tolerance of the pursuer’s nuclear weapons program to the cost of their broader geopolitical goals. A smart sheltered pursuer—and nuclear aspirants are usually quite smart—will attempt to exploit the shelter to weaponize its nuclear capabilities as quickly as possible, before the shelter potentially disappears. Short of convincing a sheltered pursuer that they do not want or need nuclear weapons after all, the only way to stop sheltered pursuers is to eliminate their shelter from sanctions or military attempts at prevention. In some cases, shelter might evaporate because the patron state independently decides that the nuclear aspirant they are sheltering is no longer worth the hassle or that the price of their future entry into the nuclear club is too steep to bear. This is what Pakistan feared when it benefited from U.S. shelter to develop nuclear weapons in the 1980s. Islamabad understood that U.S. forbearance depended on the continuation of the war in Afghanistan. Without the war, the United States would have had less need for Pakistan and therefore less willingness to protect their nuclear program. It is in fact plausible that Pakistan played a double game with the United States and attempted to prolong the Afghanistan war in order to extend the shelter and largesse it was receiving from Washington for as long as possible. The United States was a willing participant in this game, however. This was a strategic—and not an inevitable—choice, one the United States could have reversed at any time.

If shelter does not evaporate on its own, other major powers might engage the patron state (rather than the nuclear aspirant) to convince them to stop protecting the proliferator. This is the strategy the United States attempted with China over North Korea’s nuclear program during the Six Party Talks—seeking to get Beijing’s buy-in on stopping North Korean proliferation. China was fundamentally unpersuaded and continued to shield Pyongyang and issue denials about its progress while simultaneously appearing to support—but slow-roll—diplomacy and effective sanctions. There are no cases where a third party has successfully coerced or cajoled a patron state to stop protecting a “sheltered pursuer,” but driving a wedge between the nuclear pursuer and its patron if no wedge appears naturally remains the only logical option to reverse a sheltered pursuit strategy. If that can be achieved, the erstwhile sheltered pursuer would be exposed in two ways. First, the existence of a nuclear program would now be implausibly deniable and, second, the proliferator could now be vulnerable to economic or military coercion. But the difficulty of peeling off another major power’s shelter for a proliferator should not be understated, as it would be no easy task, and likely priced in by the shelter prior to extending protection to the proliferator. Major powers have—both under the bipolar Cold War configuration and after—decided that nuclear proliferation is tolerable in pursuit of other geopolitical priorities. It is likely to occur again and identifying where it might be possible provides insight into the future nuclear landscape, as a sheltered pursuit strategy—if it can be selected—has a high probability of leading to a nuclear weapons capability. As such, states like Saudi Arabia and Turkey (American frenemies) that may be able to select this strategy have a high likelihood of becoming independent nuclear states if they ever choose to do so.

### Prolif---Internal---AT: No Turkey Prolif

#### Turkey can acquire expertise, materials, and has sufficient shield from international pressure.

Gevorg Novshadyan 20, Former Contributing Writer, “Erdogan’s Nuclear Itch: Why Turkey’s Nuclear Program is a Threat to Regional Stability and the International Nonproliferation Regime — THE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW”, International Affairs Review, 09-08-2020, https://www.iar-gwu.org/blog/erdogans-nuclear-itchstrong-strongwhy-turkeys-nuclear-program-is-a-threat-to-regional-stability-and-the-international-nonproliferation-regime//SJ

The nuclear bombs at Incirlik aren’t the only way Turkey can acquire that information. Turkey’s burgeoning nuclear energy industry, aided by Russian nuclear exports, presents serious proliferation concerns, especially if Erdogan’s displeasure with the status quo is turned into policy. In the coming decades, Turkey could acquire enough technical knowledge and experience to pursue its own indigenous nuclear capabilities, and the international community could be powerless in stopping it.

Turkey is a signatory to all major IAEA protocols, and its contract with Rosatom, the Russian state nuclear agency, for the nuclear plant at Akkuyu is “proliferation resistant,” according to experts. Rosatom having effective control over Turkey’s nuclear reactor reduces the likelihood that Turkey could attain a nuclear weapon, but Turkish engineers working in the Akkuyu plant can gain valuable knowledge which they could then apply to a weapons program. Even so, experts believe that it is in Turkey’s best interest to continue abiding by its agreements and that Erdogan’s words are just bluster designed to play into the prevailing domestic anti-Western mood.

There is a history of states violating IAEA agreements, though the mechanism to punish noncompliance can easily be subverted. Consider the following scenario: The IAEA is notified by its inspectors that Turkey is violating its safeguards agreements. Having no authority to punish this noncompliance, the IAEA defers to the UN Security Council to pass judgment. Turkey, being in a military alliance with the United States and a top client for Russian nuclear exports, escapes unscathed after either the Americans or the Russians veto a UNSC resolution sanctioning Turkey and demanding it fully comply with its IAEA obligations, resulting in a green light for Turkey to continue on its path of becoming the world’s newest member of the nuclear club.

#### Prolif Card

Ioannis N. Grigoriadis & Eliza R. Ghearoghe 22. Grigordias is a Senior Fellow & Head of the Programme on Turkey, ELIAMEP. Associate Professor & Jean Monnet Chair of European Studies, Department of Political Science & Public Administration, Bilkent University. Ghearoghe is a Non-Resident Scholar, Programme on Turkey, ELIAMEP; Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, Bilkent University. “The Akkuyu NPP and Russian-Turkish Nuclear Cooperation: Asymmetries and Risks”, ResearchGate, May 2022, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/360748262\_The\_Akkuyu\_NPP\_and\_Russian-Turkish\_Nuclear\_Cooperation\_Asymmetries\_and\_Risks//SJ

Turkey and Nuclear Proliferation

Finally, another category of anxieties stemming from the introduction of nuclear power in Turkey relates to the military uses of the atom. As nuclear military technology proliferated in the Indian subcontinent and concerns grew about the Iranian nuclear development program and the possibility of proliferation in the Middle East, Turkey was among the countries that were rumored to have an interest in acquiring nuclear military capabilities, especially if the international community failed to prevent the acquisition of nuclear military capabilities by Iran and Saudi Arabia. 23 This raised concerns across the region.24 What does the Akkuyu NPP mean for the issue of nuclear proliferation? To begin with, the Akkuyu NPP comprises four pressurized water reactors (PWRs) supplied by Russia. This choice of vendor has raised suspicions, due to Russia’s negative image as a state which is lax about proliferation and a sponsor of illicit nuclear trade networks. Fears of “loose nukes” flowing out of the former Soviet arsenals into the hands of despots and terrorists during the 1990s were not without justification. Disaffected scientists did attempt to steal nuclear materials, even warheads, and sell them to interested buyers, especially violent non-state actors in the Middle East.25 Unbeknownst to the leadership in Ankara, Turkey occasionally served as a route for nuclear smuggling operations. However, the most egregious case of nuclear trafficking through Turkey did not involve nuclear materials or weapons of Russian origin; rather, the network was run by the father of the Pakistani nuclear bomb, Abdul Qadeer Khan. 26 The involvement of Istanbul-based companies in Khan’s operations gave rise to speculation that Turkey was the fifth country to purchase centrifuge technology from the Pakistani scientist.27

### Prolif---Impact---2NC

#### Absent pushback, Erdogan’s expands military presence into multiple hotspots.

Aykan Erdemir & Philip Kowalski 20. Erdemir is the senior director of the Turkey Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a former member of the Turkish parliament. Kowalski is a research associate at the Turkey Program of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, “‘Blue Homeland’ and the Irredentist Future of Turkish Foreign Policy”, War on the Rocks,9-30-2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/09/blue-homeland-and-the-irredentist-future-of-turkish-foreign-policy///SJ

Turkey and Greece, two NATO allies, nearly experienced a full-fledged military conflict in August. Two of their warships collided during a naval standoff over hydrocarbon exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean. This follows a similar naval incident in June between three Turkish vessels and the frigate of another NATO ally, France, prompting an inquiry that the alliance has been trying to keep under wraps to prevent further discord among its ranks. Behind these incidents lies Turkey’s embrace of an assertive naval concept, namely the “blue homeland,” that is poised to disrupt the transatlantic alliance in the years to come.

The “blue homeland” is an irredentist concept that claims vast sections of the Aegean and Mediterranean seas, including Greek and Cypriot maritime borders and hydrocarbon deposits, for Turkey. What began as a fringe idea among the anti-Western brass of the Turkish navy has morphed into a popular nationalist aspiration fronted by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. “Blue homeland” will continue to damage Ankara’s diplomatic relations, since Erdoğan will find it difficult to step away from maximalist claims he has personally cultivated.

The tendency to see the Turkish president’s belligerence merely as posturing for domestic consumption, and failure to develop a concerted transatlantic strategy, has provided Erdoğan with the time and opportunity to institutionalize his irredentist thinking. Absent pushback from the West, Turkish foreign and security policy will reflect Erdoğan’s worldview for decades to come. The United States and the European Union should, in response, work together to discourage the Turkish president from continuing to play a destabilizing role in NATO’s southeastern flank. They should also engage and support Turkey’s pro-Western dissidents and help amplify their voices in a media landscape almost entirely dominated by Erdoğan. Coordinating a Western response — while extremely difficult — is essential to mitigating the most damaging effects of current Turkish foreign policy.

Background to ‘Blue Homeland’

The “blue homeland” naval concept, first coined in 2006, does not stem from Erdoğan’s Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party. Instead, as Ryan Gingeras lays out in detail in his War on the Rocks piece, its origins lie with two staunchly secularist naval officers who later developed links with the Maoist-rooted neo-nationalist Homeland Party. The party and its predecessor, the Workers’ Party, were once fierce opponents of Erdoğan and his political party. However, the Homeland Party has since entered into a tactical alliance with the Justice and Development Party as the Turkish president gradually turned to his former adversaries among the ultranationalists and Eurasianists (a faction that advocates Turkey joining the Russia- and China-led anti-Western geopolitical camp) in a bid to hold onto power.

Cem Gürdeniz, a retired Turkish rear admiral who is one of the architects of the “blue homeland,” presents the concept as a response to an existential threat, and offers it as guaranteeing the ability to “sleep comfortably at home.” Gürdeniz sees the Ottoman failure to control the seas as the cause of the empire’s demise and warns that naval supremacy is crucial for the survival of the Turkish Republic, which in his opinion continues to remain in the crosshairs of Western imperialism. While the “blue homeland” is most immediately linked to maximalist Turkish claims in areas where Cyprus and Greece assert jurisdiction, Gürdeniz ultimately argues that it is also key for Turkey’s expansion of its political and economic influence across the region. Since he believes that “the Mediterranean is not sufficient for an expanding Turkey,” he urges Ankara to take control of the “Persian Gulf, Sea of Oman, Arabian Sea, Red Sea, the Eastern waters of the Atlantic Ocean, [and] North Africa.” Within the Eurasianist paradigm, the “blue homeland” is part of a broader strategy of confronting the West and establishing Turkish supremacy in the region.

For Erdoğan, this concept is also a means to expand Islamist influence. More specifically, he hopes that Turkish domination of the Eastern Mediterranean will boost Turkey’s military and proxy presence in Libya, Syria, Iraq, and beyond, and thereby strengthen the footprint of the Muslim Brotherhood and its agenda.

### Prolif---Impact---Turns Arms Racing

#### Turkish proliferation sparks regional arms racing.

Henri J. Barkey 09, visiting scholars in the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Middle East program and the Bernard L. and Bertha F. Cohen Professor at Lehigh University, “TURKEY'S PERSPECTIVES ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DISARMAMENT”, Nuclear Security Studies, 2009, https://ir.cas.lehigh.edu/sites/ir.cas2.lehigh.edu/files/HenriBarkey\_TurkeyPerspectivesNuclearWeapons.pdf//SJ

The likelihood that Turkey would seek its own path to a nuclear capability, however long this might take, would increase in the event of such a regional nuclear arms race. Domestic political pressure and the regions anarchic character would be sufficient to propel any Turkish government to begin its own program. In the meantime, the presence of US weapons on its soil would serve as a security bridge.

### Prolif---Impact---AT: Means

#### Materials

Gerhard Arnold 22. Theologian, Publisher, Middle East correspondent, “Nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and North Africa?”, European, 05-22-2022, https://magazine-the-european.com/2022/05/22/nuclear-proliferation-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa///SJ

Turkey’s leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, told supporters of his AKP party in a speech on 4th September 2019, that it was unacceptable to want to ban Turkey from possessing nuclear weapons. All developed states have them, he said. Moreover, Turkey has nuclear armed Israel in its neighbourhood – a source of serious concern for other states in the region.

This stance is surprising because Turkey joined the NPT in 1980. The country has its own uranium reserves and operates a research reactor. Technically, the path to enriched uranium would be open by reprocessing uranium waste. Also troubling are the intensive military ties that Erdogan has cultivated with Pakistan, which has already provided nuclear know-how to other countries, such as North Korea and Libya.

Agreements have been reached with Russia to build a number of nuclear power plants on the Mediterranean coast. A great many Turkish students have been sent to Russia to study nuclear science. This creates expertise for a conceivable push towards its own uranium enrichment.

US-nuclear expert John Spacapan recommended that NATO and the US should try to dissuade Turkey from possessing nuclear weapons by showing it the benefits of NATO military protection.

#### AT: Means---Pakistan

Debalina Ghoshal 20, Non-Resident Fellow, Council on International Policy and an Asia-Pacific Fellow, East-West Institute, “Will Turkey Acquire Nuclear Weapons from Pakistan?”, Defense.info,3-4-2020, https://defense.info/re-shaping-defense-security/2020/03/will-turkey-acquire-nuclear-weapons-from-pakistan///SJ

In October 2019, there were reports that Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan expressed his dissatisfaction that it was unfair on the West’s side to keep Turkey away from developing nuclear bomb.

Turkey though is under the nuclear umbrella of the United States- that is the United States hosts its tactical nuclear weapon (TNW) in Turkey, there is little doubt that Turkey would be more than happy to have its own nuclear weapons under its own command and control channels.

This would mean, not just tactical, but Turkey could have strategic nuclear weapons too on its territory as a deterrent against adversaries in the region.

Turkey is already developing long range ballistic missiles that are nuclear capable.

Post failed coup in Turkey, Erdogan has become more and more suspicious of the United States as he believes that the United States was behind the coup.

Also, Turkey lacks an effective deterrence against Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel.

Moreover, US TNWs, the B-61 nuclear gravity bombs are maintained in Incirlik base maintained by the United States and given Turkey’s decision to go ahead with the Russian S-400 air and missile defence system instead of a NATO compatible air and missile defence system, the question can clearly be raised about the future presence of this force.

Turkey however, is a party to the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and any attempt to develop nuclear weapons can lead to international sanctions against Turkey.

Turkey has already proceeded with nuclear cooperation on nuclear energy with Russia, but there is no specification unlike in the Iranian nuclear cooperation with Russia, where spent fuel will be sent from Iran to Russia, as to whether Turkey would need to do the same. But in all likelihood, Russia would demand an agreement that would require Turkey to send its spent fuel.

However, there are assumptions that Turkey in future could acquire nuclear weapons from Pakistan. Pakistan is not a party to the NPT. Moreover, Turkey has also stated that the NPT is unfair and hence, in future if the NPT became a hindrance for Turkey to acquire nuclear weapons there could be a possibility of Turkey not continuing as member of NPT.

In February 2020, Turkey and Pakistan joined hands to bolster defence ties.

According to reports, Pakistan has a tie up with Saudi Arabia that when need arises, Pakistan would provide nuclear weapons to Saudi Arabia owing to the fact that Saudi Arabia had funded Pakistan’s nuclear program. Hence, there is little scope to believe that Pakistan would not indulge in a similar arrangement with Turkey to provide nuclear weapons.

According to a Jerusalem Post quote, “in the 2000s, Turkey was a covert industrial hub for the nuclear black market of rogue Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan. Khan’s network offered buyers a menu of both technical expertise and the materials to make a bomb. The electronics parts of the centrifuges, the most important items in this covert trade, were from Turkey.”

Hence, nuclear links between Pakistan and Turkey have long existed.

The question then is would Turkey utilize the nuclear technology of Pakistan?

Pakistan has invited Turkey to invest in its energy sectors and also participate in the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Last year, Erdogan has also helped Pakistan escape a huge penalty in a litigation involving a Turkish power company, Karkey Karadeniz Elektrik Uretim that involved $1.2 billion imposed by the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Dispute. In 2019, Pakistan-Iran-Turkey also signed the International Road Transport agreement to create a trade- corridor. Thus growing cooperation between Pakistan and Turkey is clearly visible.

Even if Turkey does not acquire entire weapon system, it could acquire know how to develop nuclear weapons from Pakistan.

In fact, if Iran-Turkey relations improve considerably, Pakistan could also have a joint cooperation mechanism to train Iranian and Turkish scientists on nuclear weapon technology.

Turkey already possesses nuclear reactors and hence, they could gain nuclear expertise to pursue nuclear weapons development program in their own country than getting it from Pakistan to avoid any proliferation accusations against itself.

### Prolif---Impact---AT: Motive

#### Motive

Hakan Mehmetcik 18. Associate professor at the Department of International Relations at Marmara University, PhD in political science and international relations from Yildiz Technical University, “Nuclear Latency: The Turkish Case”, Asian Journal of Peacebuilding, November 2018, Vol. 6. Issue 2. p. 246-265//SJ

Security Related Motivations

Regional Dynamics: Proliferation literature sees security related motivations as important drivers of nuclear weapon acquisition. When it comes to latency, as a technological hedging option, regional dynamics provide significant motivations for Turkey. Iran, and its long running nuclear program, in particular is highly salient for Turkey. There are number of studies that foresee Turkish nuclear proliferation in the case of Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon (Güney 2012). Although Iran’s nuclear program has been temporarily stopped by the agreement between the P5+1 and Iran, known as The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran’s advancing nuclear infrastructure still remains a potential trigger for a regional proliferation chain where other countries opt for similar capabilities (McFall 2017). Currently, Iran is the only country that is very close to being labeled as a latent nuclear power in the region. Saudi Arabia comes first among those who cannot afford the threat of a regional rival armed with (virtual) nuclear weapons. Turkey is also one of the aforementioned candidates for nuclear weapons within the nuclear community of experts. However, Turkey and Iran have managed to keep differences at the sub-strategic level by retaining deepening economic ties and opening state-to-state channels even though there are serious conflictual rivalry patterns, especially in Syria (Stein 2015). That has not changed in the current environment even though there are a number of geopolitical rivalries among them and even beyond. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance shapes Ankara’s approach to security including the Iranian nuclear threat. Given the current diminishing level of trust between the United States and NATO, Turkey would be between a rock and a hard place in making the decision on nuclear latency, if not going for the full nuclear option. Given the low ebbs with the United States and other NATO allies, that possibility is indeed on the horizon.

Besides the Iran issue, Turkey also has a number of hot spots and increasing security risks and volatilities in its immediate periphery. External threats to Turkey, for a long time, have stemmed from non-state violent arms groups and terror networks. Ongoing PKK (Kurdistan Worker’s Party) terrorism and a proto-Kurdish state which has emerged out of the chaos in neighboring countries are an existential threat to Turkey. Yet these types of threats do not require a nuclear deterrent as Turkey’s advanced conventional capacities are potent enough. Indeed, since the end of the Cold War, Turkey has increased its development and procurement of advanced precision strike capabilities, many of which are homegrown. However, increasing threats on the menacing southern and eastern borders may force Turkey to take an alternative decision in the long-term. This is especially true when it comes to the increasing missile threat. Turkey first became truly concerned with the proliferation of ballistic missiles during the Iraq-Iran War in 1980s. Currently, all neighbors along the eastern and southern borders are known to have pursued militarization, acquisition of massive conventional weapons, proliferation of missiles, and even WMDs. Even though Israel is the only state that has not signed the NPT, Algeria, Sudan, and Israel have not signed the Biological Weapons Convention, and Egypt and Syria have thus far refused to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention. Iran is pushing ahead with its nuclear and missile programs. No state in the region is a formal member of the Missile Technology Control Regime, and many states in the region are known to have pursued nonconventional weapons in the past (Ulgen 2012). Moreover, not just states but also violent non-state actors armed with advanced weapons and missiles pose a great danger to Turkey. Turkey was under constant missile fire from ISIS for months, and is now under the threat of missiles from PKK/PYD in Syrian territory (PYD is the Syrian affiliate of the PKK). This pushes Turkey towards advancement and domestic capability building, which also increase its technical latency in terms of strategic delivery systems.

### Prolif---Impact---AT: Norms

#### Norms go unenforced behind nuclear cooperation.

Philseo Kim et al 22. Department of Nuclear and Quantum Engineering, KAIST. Jihee Kim is at the School of Business and Technology Management, College of Business, KAIST. Man-Sung Yim works at Institute for Basic Science, “Assessing proliferation uncertainty in civilian nuclear cooperation under new power dynamics of the international nuclear trade”, Energy Policy, 2022 https://www-sciencedirect-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0301421522000775//SJ

Second, our results suggest that countries have certain military motivations in engaging in the more concrete form of nuclear cooperation: they can leverage higher levels of nuclear cooperation to strengthen their weak military alliance. According to our results from Case 3, the supplier and client countries tend to complement their weak military alliance (such as entente) with concrete nuclear cooperation. This implies that the exporter countries seek other newcomer countries with whom they have not shared a defense pact. In particular, this phenomenon is more evident in Russia, one of the major export countries. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia has entered into defense pacts mainly with the former Soviet Union countries or Eastern European countries (Gibler, 2008). Thus, the results imply that Russia, which is currently expanding its nuclear exports, could use nuclear cooperation as an opportunity to expand its international ties with more countries. Turkey, Finland, Bulgaria, and China are such examples of client countries. Russia is now engaged in concrete cooperation with Turkey, Finland, and Bulgaria with whom Russia has only shared an entente pact. In addition, Russia supplied several cases of concrete nuclear cooperation with China (although China is not a newcomer country) whom they share only an entente pact. Moreover, South Korea and UAE is another related example to support this view. These countries committed nuclear power plant construction projects in 2009 while not forming any military alliance (defense or entente). Initiated by this cooperation, however, they are currently looking to strengthen their economic partnership and deepen their military cooperation (Rahman, 2021; YONHAP NEWS AGENCY, 2021). This is in line with our results that concrete cooperation could be leveraged as strengthening the military alliance.

Moreover, this result on military motivations is partly driven by the fact that some countries with the strongest military alliance (such as the defense pact) already had gone through concrete cooperation before 2000, thereby low motivation to form concrete nuclear cooperation. Canada-Argentina and the US-Poland are such examples. These country pairs formed concrete cooperation before 2000 (Fuhrmann, 2009b), but the more recent dataset of ours indicates supportive cooperation only.12

In summary, our analysis indicates that non-proliferation norms have not been strictly enforced in international nuclear cooperation under new market dynamics. Specifically, concrete nuclear cooperation could take place if the same military interest is shared even when the norm compliance levels of the client country are low. Moreover, military motivations may be behind concrete nuclear cooperation. Countries with high military expenditure tend to receive a more concrete form of nuclear cooperation, and countries also seem to use concrete nuclear cooperation to strengthen their military alliance.

### Prolif---Impact---AT: Public Opinion

#### AKP has established strongholds over public media---‘criticism’ doesn’t exist in Turkey.

Burak Kadercan 21. associate professor of strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College, “Symphony of Destruction: How the AKP Is Undermining Turkey’s Institutions”, War on the Rocks,11-22-2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/11/symphony-of-destruction-how-the-akp-is-undermining-turkeys-institutions///SJ

Victory Is Defeating the AKP

The present situation is in fact the story of a paradox inherent within the AKP’s strategy of domination. From its early years, the AKP believed that the existing personnel in the country’s leading institutions did not share the party’s “vision” of government. Hence, in order to rise to the top and stay there as long as possible, the AKP hollowed out Turkey’s institutions. It did a stunning job, increasingly displaying a preference for loyalty over merit and filling the country’s institutions with those whose abilities were overshadowed by their devotion to the party — to put it mildly.

In addition, Turkey’s new and controversial presidential system linked the country’s entire political system to one human being, with two important consequences. First, when Erdoğan sneezes, the entire country catches a cold. In other words, tying all important decisions to the president leaves the country at the mercy of one individual. Plus, having surrounded himself with “yes men,” Erdoğan is unlikely to hear even constructive criticism from his minions — a dynamic that only perpetuates the cycle.

Second, the “personalized” nature of Erdoğan’s rule has turned out to be contagious within the AKP ranks. Countless corruption allegations and the AKP’s barely hidden penchant for nepotism paint an interesting, if not necessarily surprising, picture: So-called patronage networks have taken over most institutions, ranging from various bureaucracies to the national Wushu federation. Of course, this observation does not implicate everyone affiliated with the AKP. Still, the AKP’s patronage networks have become too visible and salient for anyone to claim that they don’t exist in the first place.

The AKP is being defeated by its own victory. Over the last two decades, the party has proven itself to be a master at breaking existing institutions and norms. However, when it comes to building (or rebuilding) institutions — which is not to be mistaken for building roads and bridges — the AKP has failed, partially due its overwhelming success at breaking the very institutions it aimed to control in the first place. Paradoxically, as the AKP reaches the peak of its institutional control, it also weakens as a political actor. Perhaps the AKP broke Turkey’s institutions a little too much.

## AFF

### NU---Cooperation Now

#### Turkey-NATO and Turkey-US coop now

Kim and Utku 5-10 (Prof Dr Tongfi Kim is the Programme Director of the BA in International Affairs and Professor at the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS) of the Brussels School of Governance (BSoG-VUB) and a Senior Researcher at the KF-VUB Korea Chair. Mehmet Algin Utku is a research intern at the Brussels School of Governance. Brussels Times, 10 May 2022, “It’s time to bind Turkey to NATO,” <https://www.brusselstimes.com/223900/its-time-to-bind-turkey-to-nato>; accessed 6/23/2022) ng

The West has greater leverage The West, however, has its own tools to bind Turkey to NATO. Most importantly, the West has a superior power to reward Turkey. For instance, analysts often refer to close economic ties between Turkey and Russia, but the EU is by far Turkey’s largest trading partner and main source of investments, accounting for 33.4% of Turkey’s imports and 41.3% of its exports in 2020 (and 21 out of the 27 EU member states are also members of NATO). Military relations between Turkey and NATO also favour the West. NATO’s collective defense protects Turkey, and the decades-old alliance ties have made Turkey far more dependent on the West than on Russia. The S-400 system is expensive, but the delivery to Turkey began only in 2019, and Russia accounts for only 5% of arms import by Turkey in the last ten years between 2012 and 2021. During the decade, Russia ranked below other weapons suppliers of Turkey such as the United States (51%), Italy (16%), Spain (13%), and South Korea (6%) according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s Arms Transfers Database. For binding Turkey to NATO and wedging Turkey away from Russia, we recommend reward-based strategies rather than coercion. Academic literature suggests that positive sanctions work better and that a coercive approach is chosen by those with weaker reward power. A coercive strategy can easily antagonize the target, whereas a reward-based strategy is unlikely to worsen the status quo. Reward-binding is particularly important in relation to the Turkish public, who have resented the West’s treatment of their country in the aftermath of the Syrian refugee crisis and the 2016 coup attempt against Erdoğan. This anti-Western sentiment has been further exacerbated by pro-government Turkish media. In fact, unlike the seemingly neutral position of the Turkish government in this Russia-Ukraine war, Turkish mass media is dominated by anti-Western discourse and criticism against NATO. A poll in March revealed that 48.3% of Turks blamed the United States and NATO for the current situation in Ukraine and only 33.7% thought Russia was responsible. In the same poll, 51.7% of Turks see the United States as the biggest threat to their country as opposed to Russia (19.4%). As a Turkish scholar points out, anti-Western sentiments that developed for years will not easily disappear from the Turkish public opinion even after Erdoğan’s recent U-turn. In international security and diplomacy, NATO allies have already begun taking a conciliatory approach toward Ankara. This can be seen in the recent Franco-Turkish rapprochement and the Biden administration’s support for “appropriate U.S. defense trade ties with Turkey.” Economic reward-binding by NATO allies is likely to be appreciated by Erdoğan, who faces the presidential election in 2023. More importantly, this is a chance for the West to offer the olive branch to the Turkish public as Turkey experiences the highest level of inflation in 20 years, with Erdoğan’s economic mismanagement, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the war in Ukraine creating a perfect storm for the economy. Deepening of the EU-Turkey customs union and other positive economic incentives are useful tools to improve media freedom and human rights in Turkey, and the West should ask for domestic political concessions from Erdoğan. Rather than using Turkey’s political problems as excuses to keep Turkey at distance, however, economic rewards should be employed to bind the hearts of the Turkish public to NATO.

#### New security mechanism thumps—US and Turkey are increasing cooperation

Ertan 4/6 — Nazlan Ertan is Al-Monitor's former culture editor. She is a Turkish blogger, journalist and editor who has worked in Ankara, Paris and Brussels for various Turkish and international publications, including the Hurriyet Daily News, CNN Turk and BBC Turkish Service."Turkey, US launch new strategic mechanism amid Ukraine crisis," Al-Monitor: The Pulse of the Middle East, 4-6-2022, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/04/turkey-us-launch-new-strategic-mechanism-amid-ukraine-crisis, accessed 6-24-2022, WMK

Following months of diplomacy, Turkey and the United States have launched a strategic mechanism to boost cooperation in areas such as economy and defense.

“There is a new energy in ties,” Victoria Nuland, the US State Department's undersecretary for political affairs, told the Turkish media after meeting with Turkish Foreign Ministry and Presidency officials. The new mechanism allows Turkish and American officials to talk about all of the issues, from trade to human rights and civil society, or regional issues from Syria to Ukraine, she added.

A US-Turkey joint statement on April 4 held out the possibility of a minister-level meeting later this year. According to diplomatic sources, this is likely to occur in Washington, marking the first official visit of Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu since President Joe Biden took office.

The statement said that Nuland and Turkish Deputy Foreign Minister Sedat Onal "met in Ankara to review topics of mutual interest, including economic and defense cooperation, counterterrorism, and key areas of shared regional and global interes.”

“If the U.S. and Turkey were old friends engaged in a dispute, this would be the moment they unblocked each other’s number,” joked Soner Cagaptay, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the author of “A Sultan in Autumn.” Diplomatic sources maintain that the aim is to focus on positive areas of cooperation, rather than dwell on the chronic problems that have dogged the relations.

### LT---Coop Moderates Erdogan

#### NATO cooperation moderates Turkish aggression

Kirişci 22, nonresident senior fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe's Turkey Project at Brookings, with an expertise in Turkish foreign policy and migration studies. From 2013 until 2020, he was TÜSİAD senior fellow at Brookings and director of the Turkey Project (Kemal, “Can the Russia-Ukraine crisis offer an opportunity to re-anchor Turkey in NATO?,” Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/02/16/can-the-russia-ukraine-crisis-offer-an-opportunity-to-re-anchor-turkey-in-nato/)//BB

However, all is not lost. The Ukrainian crisis has increasing questions about the wisdom of Turkey’s cozy relationship with Russia and a greater appreciation of NATO’s value, recently reiterated by two prominent retired Turkish ambassadors. Interestingly, their reasoning is not that different than the Turkish diplomats and ministers of foreign affairs from the 1940s and 1950s who played a central role in negotiating Turkey’s entry into NATO, revealing the continuity that comes with geography but also the persistent commitment to a Western vocation dating from Ottoman times. Moving forward, revitalizing Turkey’s traditional Western vocation and its NATO membership will be dependent on two developments. Erdoğan is failing to address Turkey’s mounting problems. His approval ratings have dropped from almost 56% at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic to 38.6% at the end of 2021, while the governing AKP has also steadily lost support and was down to 23.9%. Under these circumstances, the opposition stands a growing chance of winning the next elections if they are reasonably free. However, the opposition led by the social democratic People’s Republican Party (CHP) has remained by and large quiet on foreign policy issues and shied from advocating pro-Western policies. This would need to change, and the opposition would need to adopt an informed and rational platform that dispels prejudices and better explains to the public why revitalizing stronger relations with the West would benefit Turkey’s interests. The West needs to do its part too. Foremost, there needs to be a recognition that there is political change in the offing in Turkey. It is far from certain but there is a decent likelihood that the next elections would be won by the opposition. In the meantime, it will be important for the U.S. to recognize that the current crisis over Ukraine has once more shown the strategic value of Turkey to NATO and develop, together with other allies, a constructive narrative that would welcome a post-election Turkey back into the core of the trans-Atlantic alliance. Given the stalling out of its enlargement process, the EU is unlikely to be able to play the robust role it did in reforming Turkish democracy in the 2000s. But just like 70 years ago, Turkey’s NATO membership could become a conduit for mutually reinforcing Turkey’s Western vocation and its democracy while benefiting European security, including that of Ukraine.

### LT---Coop Solves Crises

#### NATO-Turkey cooperation de-escalates crises

**Got ‘20** – Author based in Europe and works on security and defense issues (Antoine, War on the Rocks, “TURKEY’S CRISIS WITH THE WEST: HOW A NEW LOW IN RELATIONS RISKS PARALYZING NATO”, November 19, 2020, <https://warontherocks.com/2020/11/turkeys-crisis-with-the-west-how-a-new-low-in-relations-risks-paralyzing-nato/> )//RG

Ultimately, however, fears of a Turkish realignment with Russia are likely overblown. Moscow and Ankara’s relations have historically been fraught, and the recent rapprochement stems more from opportunism and coinciding interests than a major reorientation in Turkish foreign policy at the expense of its traditional alliances. In fact, Turkey’s forceful posturing is making it steadily more at odds with Russia in conflict environments where both operate, including Nagorno-Karabakh, Syria, and Libya. Its growing involvement in the Caucasus, for instance, has brought it dangerously close to armed confrontation with NATO’s primary contestant, Russia, which supports Armenia under the Collective Security Treaty Organization framework. This was highlighted by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s underscoring of Russia’s “obligations to Armenia.” Though the violence ended there, Turkey’s proxy saber-rattling contributes to increase risks of accident or miscalculation leading to armed confrontation with Russia — something all parties are eager to avoid. With antagonistic security interests at stake, Turkey and Russia are ultimately more likely to balance against rather than align with each other, though several NATO allies continue to regard Ankara’s ties to Moscow with a deep-seated sense of suspicion. A Constructive Role for NATO As Turkey and the European Union ramp up their rhetorical joust, it is perhaps no surprise that NATO is better placed to act as a forum for the de-escalation of the crisis. It is indeed Turkey’s membership to NATO, and the daily staff-to-staff contacts which it generates, that makes the alliance able to work as a platform where their diplomats can negotiate, exchange information, and address issues of common strategic interest with European counterparts, thus helping to undermine the “us-versus-them” mentality which at times prevails across E.U. institutions. As the latter hardens its rhetoric, NATO can generate the much-needed safety valve where diplomatic efforts have a chance of succeeding**.** To this end, the alliance should capitalize on the consultative function of its institutions to allow for parties to sit together, express their views and concerns on national and collective security considerations, and improve mechanisms to reach a consensus on the means to address any perceived challenges. Consultations have indeed always been at the core of the alliance, and remain important vectors for addressing intermember disagreements. The recent announcement by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg that a military de-confliction mechanism would be established between Greece and Turkey is but one example of the productive results that such diplomatic efforts can yield, and an encouraging sign that the two sides are not willing to see their relations deteriorate further. Yet a limited arrangement between Greece and Turkey is also unlikely to address the deep-seated causes of the political turmoil between Ankara and European allies, and NATO should find new and improved ways to act as a forum to discuss, and to act, where necessary, on issues affecting the security interests of its member states. This is key if the organization wants to remain flexible and relevant in the increasingly contested and fast-paced security environment of today.

### LT---xt: Erdogan is Peaceful

#### Ankara’s aiming to be a mediator not a provocateur---prolif prevents their goal of global recognition.

Leonardo Jacopo Maria Mazzucco 22. Researcher in the Strategic Studies Department at TRENDS, Research & Advisory, MA degree in Comparative International Relations from Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, “Turkey’s delicate balancing act: Mediating between the West, Russia, and Ukraine”, Trend Research, 06-17-2022, https://trendsresearch.org/insight/turkeys-delicate-balancing-act-mediating-between-the-west-russia-and-ukraine///SJ

From a foreign politics perspective, Turkey envisages its mediation efforts in the Ukraine-Russia war as an opportunity to boost its global stance. Indeed, with Turkey walking a fine line with the West and gradually mending fences with major players in the Middle East,[46] Ankara has a vested interest in presenting itself as a great regional power that has the leverage to tilt the balance of power in the event of an international crisis.

The idea of presenting itself as a central state reflects the national role conception [47] of the Turkish leadership, which is a recurrent pattern in the political discourse of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the party led by President Erdoğan. [48] Thus, taking on the role of ‘mediator-in-chief’ and being a key player in the brokering of a peace deal as the world holds its breath fits perfectly with Turkey’s current agenda, which will ultimately serve to boost its diplomatic credentials and status among its NATO allies and EU partners.[49]

Surrounded by a tension-ridden regional environment littered with flash points prone to armed escalation, Ankara is particularly vested in preventing the regional order from falling into complete disarray. Indeed, with the Turkish economy having plummeted to historic lows over the past two years, a war between Ankara’s two critical economic partners does not bode well for the country’s economic recovery. Protracted economic distress and spiraling inflation rates have prompted Turkey to actively seek a political settlement. Given the country’s flagging growth, compartmentalizing the fallout on the economy and stabilizing the regional order are critical goals for Turkey.

#### Turkey and the US can cooperate to produce

Bechev 22, PhD, nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. He is also a research fellow at the Center of Slavic, Eurasian, and East European Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the director of the European Policy Institute, a think-tank based in Sofia, Bulgaria. (Dimitar, “A rival or an awkward partner? Turkey’s relationship with the West in the Balkans,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 22.1)//BB

Turkey as an awkward partner

Despite the rift between Turkey and the West, Ankara’s Balkan policy is neither disruptive nor entirely beholden to neo-imperialist fantasies. Rather it reflects a mixture of ideology and pragmatic calculations and is often a product of circumstances rather than grand designs. To start with, there is no evidence that Erdogan or the AKP are systematically exporting authoritarian institutions and practices abroad, undermining the West. Authoritarianism in the Balkans is a home-grown phenomenon and not an import. In the 1990s, for instance, both Serbia and Croatia saw the emergence of strongman regimes led respectively by Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tudjman. Such regimes combined democratic and authoritarian elements, e.g. competitive elections in tandem with state capture skewing the playing field, the propagation of illiberal ideology and the suppression of minorities. It would be far-fetched to fault Erdoğan, Putin, Viktor Orbán or anyone else about the rule of law and accountability deficits in a region with historical experience with competitive politics but is still a novice when it comes to democratic governance. External powers may take advantage of state capture and corruption, as they often do, but these are by and large local conditions liable to be exploited (Bechev 2017; Bieber and Tzifakis 2019). Foreign meddling could well exacerbate matters – e.g. Turkey’s partnership with or outright patronage over certain politicians and factions in Bosnia and Herzegovina consolidates their grip on power and public resources – but is not the root cause of democratic dysfunctionality. Secondly, Turkey is not always the lone wolf it appears to be. A ‘neo-Ottoman’ policy would imply that Turkey acts mostly unilaterally instead of through institutions or alliances such as NATO. To be sure, Turkish foreign policy has a strong unilateralist impulse, as many scholars and experts have pointed out. Self-reliance and distrust of foreigners are entrenched in the Turkish public’s perceptions and attitudes (Aydın 2019). Ankara has made moves and asserted its interests in the Balkans, such as providing economic assistance through TİKA), supporting domestic political players aligned with the AKP, funding schools, trying to mediate in regional disputes etc. The same was very much true of the Middle East before the Arab Spring when Davutoğlu was touting the notion of Turkey as an order-setter (düzen kurucu ülke) (Davutoğlu 2001). At the same time, even with President Erdoğan in complete control and nationalism rampant, foreign policy has played along and adapted to multilateral institutions. To give the obvious example, despite its strained relationship with NATO and the EU, Ankara continues to support their enlargement to the Balkans, as in the AKP’s early years of power. Rather than pursue an obstructionist strategy, as does Russia, and try to wean countries into its diplomatic orbit, it ratified without delay Montenegro and North Macedonia’s NATO accession treaty. There is no rhetorical or substantive opposition from Ankara vis-à-vis the EU’s expansion (Daily Sabah 2020). That makes sense from a purely rational perspective. Bringing new members also means expanded market access for Turkey thanks to the Customs Union with the EU. Notably, Turkey is amongst the top five export markets for Romania, Bulgaria and Greece, all members of the Union.7 In short, there still remains a multilateral dimension to Turkey’s engagement with the Balkans, even if it gets overshadowed by Erdoğan’s leader-to-leader diplomacy (Büyük and Öztürk 2019). To sum up, despite the overarching trends towards de-Europeanization affecting both Turkey and the Balkans, there remains institutional ties and economic ties that bind them both in the Western sphere. This creates space for Turkey and Western actors to join forces in the region on an ad hoc basis.

### AT ISIS---High Now

#### **ISIS has already increased power – recent attacks prove**

Al-Hajj 3/15/22 [Taim Al-Hajj, Investigative Syrian journalist, Carnegie Middle East Center; “The Insurgency of ISIS in Syria”; March 15, 2022; DOA: 6/25/22; <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/86643l>; Lowell-ES]

In January 20, 2022, insurgents affiliated with the Islamic State (ISIS), attacked Al-Sina prison in the Ghweiran neighborhood in the city of al-Hasakah in Syria’s far northeast. The attack sent a message to many beyond the borders of the small city that the organization has significant military, financial, and media abilities. The raid, one of a long series of multi-pronged attacks in Syria and its neighboring Iraq, highlights ISIS’ resolve to model its post-caliphate strategy for insurgencies that are not necessarily contingent on territorial control.

Such a departure from the group’s basic creed was unimaginable back in 2014 when ISIS was at the height of its power under the leadership of its forefathers Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Abu Ibrahim al-Qurashi. A close reading of the group’s recent escalated attacks reveals that ISIS is using a pattern of tactics that are very similar to the ones they adopted prior to 2010 when they relied on traditional combat, attrition attacks, and guerrilla wars.

For example, the well-planned, wide-scale attack on the prison, used two car bombs that detonated at the main gate, allowing several of the group’s fighters to breach it and storm into the prison from several directions. In a statement on the outcome of the attack, ISIS said they were able to “free a number of detainees,” but the international coalition backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) denied this and claimed they had killed 370 prisoners who attempted to escape during the weeklong clashes. SDF was able to regain full control of the prison on January 31, 2022.

Regardless, this brazen attack was a stark reminder of ISIS’ organizational strength that had been long forgotten since the fall of the border town of Baghouz in March 2019 when former American president Donald Trump announced the collapse of the group’s territorial caliphate. Since then, ISIS and its affiliate militias have decided to revert to guerrilla warfare and working under a unified leadership, which has shown exceptional malleability, especially in Syria. They have been able to efficiently restructure themselves organizationally at the military, security, administrative, and media fronts.

NON TERRITORIAL RESURGENCE

The group’s resurgence in Syria does not seem particularly territorial. For ISIS, rural insurgency and desert combat are no less important than urban warfare as a means to achieve its objectives and ensure its next return. The group has spared no effort in attacking the Syrian regime’s forces, its allied militias, the Russian troops, the coalition forces, the SDF forces, and, at times, the Syrian opposition forces.

ISIS realizes that territorial control gives it leverage, but given the current circumstances, it decided that becoming a covert network was the better option. Judging by the group’s behavior in Libya, Nigeria, West Africa, Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Iraq, where their leadership has long been headquartered, the Islamic State is executing a low-level insurgency and keeping a low profile.

A recent report issued by the United States Pentagon indicates that ISIS has reshuffled its ranks, so that there is a reemergence of fighters in Syria, taking advantage of the U.S. withdrawal. The report also confirms that the organization has strengthened its armed capabilities in Iraq using, as it seems, a residual wealth that António Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations, estimated at up to $300 million.

Guterres said that the current lull in ISIS-directed attacks may only be temporary, and he expressed acute concern about a possible growth in the number of attacks. Guterres’ concerns may be well justified given the number of operations that have been executed by the group and announced through its news affiliate Amaq News Agency. According to the United Nations the estimated number of foreign fighter recruits is between 24,000 and 30,000, including 10,000 in Syria and Iraq. Analysts specialized in Jihadist groups believe that defeating the group’s Caliphate dream is not the best way to eradicate it on the ground. The fact that ISIS is turning into a non-spatial military body has enabled it to adapt to its new realities and show viability under adverse circumstances whilst also consolidating its large geographical presence.

The group’s attacks in Syria and Iraq, the two countries that witnessed the inception and the death of its Caliphate dream, demonstrate its increased powers, even if its ability to control territory has plummeted with the demise of its founding fathers.

### AT ISIS---Dead

#### No threat of ISIS resurgence.

Anchal Vohra 22, columnist for Foreign Policy and a freelance TV correspondent and commentator on the Middle East based in Beirut, “ISIS Can't Even Direct Lone-Wolf Attacks Anymore”, Foreign Policy, 04-26-2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/26/the-islamic-state-cant-even-pull-off-lone-wolf-attacks-anymore///SJ

The jihadi Islamic State group recently called on its supporters to resume attacks in Europe while the West is focused on Russia’s Ukraine invasion. In a speech posted online last week, Islamic State spokesman Abu Omar al-Muhajir asked supporters to take advantage of the “crusaders fighting each other” by launching a global offensive to take revenge for a former Islamic State chief killed during a raid by U.S. special forces in northwest Syria earlier this year. He also asked sympathizers in Israel to “arm themselves” against the Israeli state and claimed that only the return of an Islamic caliphate could liberate Palestinians.

Since the Islamic State was territorially defeated in 2019, analysts have been debating whether the group will reemerge as a major threat. That conversation became urgent in January when the group carried out a prison break in Hasakah, northeast Syria, to free thousands of its members. In 2020, the group claimed an average of 45 attacks in Syria every month. It has also gained strength in Afghanistan and in parts of Africa over the last few years. At least two recent terrorist attacks in Israel, in the cities of Beersheba and Hadera, were claimed by Islamic State sympathizers.

While it is true that the Islamic State’s ideology has not evaporated, the group no longer seems capable of directing even basic lone-wolf attacks. Most of the recent attacks claimed by the group were carried out by individuals who simply piggybacked on its jihad without having any logistical or material support.

The Islamic State’s resurgence in the West is a possibility, but there are no signs of it as of yet. The Islamic State has neither the manpower nor the resources, and above all it has lost the popularity it once had to lure disaffected Europeans to launch massive attacks in the West. “I don’t think the Ukraine war matters much for what happens with IS,” said Aron Lund, a fellow with the Century Foundation. He added that in its latest message the group is merely trying “to sound relevant and up to date, latching onto current events.”

#### Turkey is lacking in money, fighters, and ammunition

Jennifer Holleis 22. Author at DW, “In Syria and Iraq IS is still capable, but no global threat”, DW, 01-26-2022, https://www.dw.com/en/in-syria-and-iraq-is-is-still-capable-but-no-global-threat/a-60549917//SJ

Money, fighters, ammunition

According to a 2021 report by the US Treasury Department, IS finances have shrunk significantly, but not dried up entirely.

"IS has generated revenue through extortion of local businesses, kidnapping for ransom, and looting," the study says.

Furthermore, a substantial part of their funds stem from international money services.

"In addition to revenue generated from its illicit financial activities, IS also has access to tens of millions of dollars in cash reserves disbursed across the region," the report states.

While this seems a lot, it is only a fraction of what the jihadist group once had, and it is certainly not enough to kickstart a new caliphate in the region.

The group's manpower is also dwindling. The UN estimates that 10,000 of the once 100,000 fighters are still holding out.

"I don't think that IS is now succeeding in actively recruiting new members. The question is to which extent old members are still regrouping in the Iraqi and Syrian desert, or whether freed IS prisoners are re-joining the group," Julien Barnes-Dacey, Director of the Middle East and North Africa program at the European Council for Foreign Relations (ECFR) in Berlin, told DW.

Given that there are no realistic alternatives for many fighters, including the ones that managed to escape from the prison break, it is highly likely that they could be willing to re-join IS. However, this won't bring up numbers to previous levels.

The group's equipment is also far inferior to what it once was.

The most recent attack in al-Hasaka indicates that IS owns arms, but they consist mostly of light and medium weapons.

"On the one hand, their weapons were stolen from the Iraqi army's inventory, on the other, IS has deposited numerous weapons in hiding places, such as dried-up wells in the town Al-Baghouz Fawqani, one of their biggest strongholds," Jassim Mohamad, director of the European Centre for Counterterrorism and Intelligence Studies in Bonn (ECCIS) told DW.

### AT Kurds

#### Turkish soldiers are engaging in anti-Kurdish violence

ANF 6/22 (“State terror in Van: "We were mistreated because we are Kurds",” ANF News, 22 Jun 2022, <https://anfenglishmobile.com/features/state-terror-in-van-we-were-mistreated-because-we-are-kurds-60730)//mcu>

TW: descriptions of beatings/violence

It is difficult to find a term other than state terror for the actions of the Turkish forces in their arrest operation in the village of Xaşkan near the Başkale district of Van. Turkish soldiers stormed the village on 20 June, abusing the inhabitants and firing hundreds of shots into the air. This is one of the few cases where the brutality of the security forces in rural Kurdish regions has been documented on video. "They threatened us with death" After the raid, villagers collected some of the bullet casings that had been fired. So far they have counted 400 of them. Relatives and neighbours of the arrested Mehmet Emin Atlı told the Mezopotamya news agency (MA) about the attack. Abdulhamit Atlı stated: "Soldiers raided the house after surrounding the village early in the morning. Atlı's wife and daughter were beaten by the soldiers. We collected 400 cartridge cases in our village. They threatened to kill us.” "Beatings with rifle butts, gunshots and insults" Atlı reported that he asked the commander of the soldiers to act according to "law and order" and asked, "What kind of law are you applying by hitting with rifle butts, shooting and insulting? There is no army fighting here. Why are you firing so many shots here?" He continued, "At least a thousand bullets were fired here. We have collected only a part of them. There are laws in Turkey. Can these apply differently in the West and here? We were insulted in the worst way. They did this to us even though we had done nothing at all against the soldiers." Daughter pushed off stairs Ayten Atlı, the daughter of the arrested man, reported that the police stormed their house around six in the morning. She said: "I saw hundreds of soldiers in front of our house. I asked the soldiers why they had come. They explained that they were going to search the house. When I asked them to show me the search warrant, they started pushing me. That is why I explained to them that I had just had an operation. Although I had told them that, they pushed me off the stairs. After the fall, I could not stand up. Because of that impact, I have pain and swelling in my lower back." "We are not sure of our lives" Atlı reported that the soldiers kept shouting at her and shooting into the air for minutes. "It was such a hopeless situation, we couldn't find a place to flee to. The whole settlement was under permanent military control anyway.” Ayten Atlı, who sees the soldiers' actions as an expression of **anti-Kurdish racism,** said: "It was so obvious that they had not come for an arrest. It was as if they had come to take revenge. They beat me and my mother for minutes. It was sergeant Mehmet K. who beat us the hardest. We will file a complaint against this person. There is clearly racism here. If they continue to pressure us in this way, we will have to leave here. Because we are no longer sure of our lives. We are very afraid that anything could happen again at any moment." Call for solidarity Ayten Atlı called for solidarity and protest: "We have been oppressed for years. We had no proof before, but now we have some. We were beaten by soldiers in front of our house. If this beating is not because we are Kurds, then what is it? We want justice. That's why everyone should get involved and stand by our side." Kicked on the ground by soldiers Dilber Atlı, the wife of the arrested man, told how a soldier kicked her leg and she fell down. She stated; "When I fell to the ground, they continued to beat me. They hit my husband and tried to put him in the vehicle. They started shooting because I protested against it. I still have kick marks and bruises on my leg. Our children are psychologically destroyed. We were abused and insulted. How can a soldier of the state do such a thing? Is there no such thing as law and order anymore? Is it the job of soldiers to torture people? We do not accept this situation and will address the necessary authorities. We want those who committed these atrocities against us to be held accountable before the law.”

### AT Greece-Turkey

#### No Greece War

Carassava 6/1 — Journalist at The Times. Anthee Carassava, "Greek Forces on High Alert over Crisis with Turkey," VOA, 6-1-2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/greek-forces-on-high-alert-over-crisis-with-turkey/6598746.html, accessed 6-25-2022, WMK

Greece's armed forces are on high alert in the Eastern Aegean Sea as tensions escalate with Turkey. Officials have been responding to what they say are mounting provocations by Turkey's leadership.

Senior Greek Defense Ministry sources say the military intelligence they have gathered point to the prospect of so-called hybrid threats that Greece may face from its neighbor Turkey as the two NATO allies compete for oil and gas drilling rights in contested parts of the Aegean and Mediterranean seas.

The points of friction between the two countries are many.

A crisis, the sources say, may also spring from a sudden surge in refugee flows from Turkey, or from unexpected wildfires in remote locations or islands in the Aegean Sea that Turkey wants to see demilitarized.

Some security analysts say that while Turkey's recent actions - including the bellicose remarks of its leader - are serious, an armed conflict is unlikely. Retired General Leonidas Tzoumis said both countries stand to lose from a military confrontation, but he warned that Turkish actions may lead to a miscalculation. That prospect, he said, requires heightened vigilance by Greece's armed forces.

Tzoumis said Greece is facing what he calls a classic Turkish game of controlled escalation, one of repeated provocations that can trigger a serious enough incident that would eventually force Greece to negotiate matters like the Aegean Sea dispute and territorial rights that Greece has been refusing to discuss because - the analyst said - it does not want to cede an inch.

### AT Prolif---Turkey Specific

#### Turkey won’t prolif.

Nonprolif regime, no materials

Hakan Mehmetcik 18. Associate professor at the Department of International Relations at Marmara University, PhD in political science and international relations from Yildiz Technical University, “Nuclear Latency: The Turkish Case”, Asian Journal of Peacebuilding, November 2018, Vol. 6. Issue 2. p. 246-265//SJ

Conclusion

From a proliferation standpoint, enrichment technologies for reactors can be applied to nuclear weapon development. That is, if a country has the ability to enrich uranium to reactor level (low-level enrichment) then that country can level up its uranium stockpile to weapons grade (high-level enrichment) within a relatively small amount of time, which gives a country latency from a technical point of view. The key point here is whether the country that has reprocessing capabilities obeys the rules of the international nonproliferation regime. Departing from this fact, Turkey has not announced any plans to pursue enrichment or reprocessing; on the contrary, by the nature of its existing operation and finance model for its projected power plants and by the nature of its commitment to the nonproliferation regime, it has shown good practices. Turkey has reiterated that uranium enrichment is a future long-term option should Turkey build a lot of nuclear power reactors, but is not currently being pursued (Hibbs 2015). Moreover, nuclear fuel has always been available on the international market for small and medium sized nuclear programs. Indigenous production is not economical unless there is intent for industrial scale enrichment (Fitzpatrick 2014). In this sense, there are at least two important points that can be drawn from the assessments given in this article: (1) Turkey will not have industrial-scale enrichment or reprocessing capabilities in the short- or mediumterm; and (2) as long as Turkey remains a well-behaved member of the nonproliferation community and takes care to protect its clear record, suspicion of “bad intentions” is ill-placed. Such changes are only possible if Turkey’s domestic political and external security environment change dramatically.

#### Too many factors prevent Turkish prolif.

George Perkovich & Sinan ÜLgen 15. Perkovich is the Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Chair and vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Ülgen is a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe in Brussels, “Why Turkey Won’t Go Nuclear”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,4-10-2015, https://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/10/why-turkey-won-t-go-nuclear-pub-59756//SJ

Turkey has valid economic arguments for developing the capacity to produce nuclear energy. Primary energy imports comprise almost half of Turkey’s chronic current-account deficit, because the country imports more than 90% of its oil and natural gas. Moreover, unlike in Europe, Turkey’s electricity demand continues to grow at 5-6% per year. Turkish policymakers see nuclear power as an almost indispensable tool for enhancing energy security and reducing the import bill.

These economic interests, combined with national-security considerations, give Turkey an incentive not to seek nuclear weapons. As a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Turkey is prohibited from developing military applications of the technology. If it were perceived to be breaking this commitment, other states, including those that would otherwise contribute to its nuclear energy program, would turn against it and jeopardize its ability to meet growing demand at an affordable cost. This, in turn, would undermine the economic growth that has been central to sustaining the government’s popular support over the past two decades.

Moreover, Turkey is a member of NATO and thus benefits from the security guarantee that the alliance provides, including its nuclear umbrella. Indeed, the US has based nuclear weapons in Turkey for decades. More recently, NATO and the US have deployed ballistic missile defenses in the country. If the Turkish government sought to acquire its own nuclear weapons, it would jeopardize these security guarantees and turn NATO against it.

In any case, Turkey lacks the know-how and technical infrastructure to produce a nuclear weapon quickly, and the country would need a long time – probably more than a decade – to develop this capacity. During this period, Turkey would face severe political, economic, and security pressures not only from the US and other NATO states, but also from Russia, Iran, and others.

Meanwhile, Turkey’s immediate security threats would be exacerbated. Nuclear weapons would do little to reduce the dangers posed by Syria’s violent disintegration, the rise of the Islamic State, and the unresolved challenge of Kurdish separatism. Turkey’s relations with Iran, which heretofore have been manageable, could become more prone to crisis.

All of these considerations point to the serious risks that seeking nuclear weapons would pose to Turkey’s security. These risks could in turn exacerbate internal discord in the country at a time when the ruling Justice and Development Party is struggling to retain popular support.

#### **No Turkey Prolif or inevitable – tons of alt causes**

Eldridge 11 (William G. Eldridge – United States Air Force Commander, “The Credibility of America’s Extended Nuclear Deterrent The Case of the Republic of Turkey”, Air University Press, September 2011, <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Papers/wp_0018_eldridge_extended_nuclear_deterrent.pdf>, MG)

Turkey likely will “tip” if Middle East nuclear proliferation becomes widespread **and** NATO is perceived as ineffective **and** if US-Turkish relationships collapse. According to one Turkish diplomat, “**things would have to get really bad**” for Turkey to pursue its own nuclear weapons. Despite a rocky history, current NATO-Turkish and US-Turkish relations **remain fundamentally sound**, but leadership or regional security changes could strain those relationships. Factors working against Turkish nuclear weapons proliferation include the lack of support by **senior Turkish leaders**, the high value Turkey places on **alliance relationships**, the **lack of funding** for civilian or military nuclear programs, and Turkish **treaty agreements** forswearing nuclear weapons.

Despite these proliferation disincentives, Turkey will probably hedge against falling behind a potential Middle East nuclear energy (or nuclear arms) race by developing a civilian nuclear power program. As Iran continues pursuing nuclear enrichment and possibly a nuclear weapon, Turkey will likely begin to develop a nuclear power program beyond its current research stage. Turkish leaders do not fear an attack from Iran, but instead they are concerned with the shift in the regional balance of power that may result from a nuclear-armed Iran. Hedging with civilian nuclear power provides scientific and engineering expertise needed for an aggressive Turkish nuclear program if Iran’s regional influence increases or a broader Middle East nuclear arms race begins. Therefore, the United States should continue its involvement in Turkey’s emerging civilian nuclear programs utilizing the existing 2008 US-Turkish nuclear cooperation agreement (123 Agreement), develop additional cooperation agreements that encourage Turkey to forgo nuclear and spent fuel processing, encourage scientific exchanges, and consider financially supporting Turkey’s civilian nuclear energy program. The credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence for Turkey is best signaled **not** through US nuclear inventory types or numbers, but by demonstrations of US political, economic, and **security relationships** with Turkey. Turkey’s most important political and security concerns include

• credibility of NATO, EU, and US support for Turkish security;

• Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) terrorism;

• Kurdish activism in Iraq supporting a separate Kurd state;

• Cyprus;

• relations with Iran and Armenia;

• energy security and access; and

• economic strength and domestic stability.

A close US-Turkish partnership that addresses these issues can strengthen US credibility as a reliable ally. A strong US- Turkish relationship also serves as a disincentive for Turkish nuclear weapons acquisition.

#### **Turkey isn’t going to prolif**

Ülgen 12 (Sinan Ülgen - visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe in Brussels where he researches the implications of Turkish foreign policy for Europe and the United States, “TURKEY AND THE BOMB”, The Carnegie Papers, February 2012, <https://carnegieendowment.org/files/turkey_bomb.pdf>, MG)

Turkey has a stellar history of nonproliferation and has signed on to **every** relevant IAEA and international instrument governing the spread of nuclear technology. Moreover, it is a member of NATO and an EU candidate country. It is **unlikely**, absent a rupture in relations with its NATO allies, a significant change in its security environment, or a drastic reevaluation of Ankara’s immediate interests by the civilian leadership, that Turkey would consider developing nuclear weapons illicitly.

A Turkish decision to proliferate would seriously complicate its international standing, undermine its economic resurgence, and seriously damage relations with the United States and its other NATO allies. Moreover, any Turkish move toward weaponization would draw a harsh rebuke from the United States and would likely be met by an American proposal to strengthen security guarantees, as well as the threat of sanctions if Turkey were to continue its weapons efforts. Given Turkey’s nonnuclear history and its long-standing reliance on the NATO security guarantee, it is **hard to imagine a scenari**o where Turkey would simply cast aside its policy in favor of an independent weapons capability.

Instead of developing its own nuclear weapons capability, Turkey seems more interested in pursuing robust **conventional** capabilities that could, in theory, replace some of the missions previously reserved for nuclear weapons. To do so, Turkey has turned to foreign suppliers but has also committed to begin designing and manufacturing hightech weapons domestically. And it will likely continue to increase its indigenous intelligence, surveillance, and information management capabilities.26 Turkey’s changing military posture is aimed at countering the threats posed by nonstate actors and bolstering Turkey’s conventional war-fighting capabilities. Interoperability with NATO forces remains the key component of Turkey’s defense policy and it is **unlikely** that Ankara would threaten its union with its most important allies.

#### **No middle east nuclear arms race impact – assumes literally every scenario**

Cook 12 (Stephen A. Cook -  Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, “Don’t Fear a Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East”, Foreign Policy, 2 April 2012, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/04/02/dont-fear-a-nuclear-arms-race-in-the-middle-east/>, MG)

Most important to understanding why the Middle East **will not be a zone of unrestrained proliferation** is the significant difference between desiring nukes and the actual capacity to acquire them. Of all three states that Shavit mentioned, the one on virtually everyone’s list for possible nuclear proliferation in response to Iran is Turkey. But the Turkish Republic is already under a nuclear umbrella: Ankara safeguards roughly 90 of the United States’ finest B61 gravity bombs at Incirlik airbase, near the city of Adana. These weapons are there because Turkey is a NATO member, and Washington’s extended deterrence can be expected to at least partially mitigate Turkey’s incentives for proliferation.

But even if the Turks wanted their own bomb, they have almost **no capacity** to develop nuclear weapons technology. Indeed, **Turkey** does not even possess the capability to deliver the 40 B61 bombs at Incirlik that are allocated to Turkish forces in the event of an attack, according to a report released by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Given the changes in Turkey’s foreign policy and its drive for global influence, it is conceivable that it will want to develop a Turkish version of France’s force de frappe. However, Ankara would literally be **starting from scratch**: Turkey has no fissile material, cannot mine or enrich uranium, and does not possess the technology to reprocess spent fuel, all of which are required for nuclear weapons development.

This does not mean that Turkey is not interested in nuclear technology. Yet Ankara’s efforts, to the extent that they exist beyond the two small-scale facilities in Ankara and Kucukcekmece, are directly related to the country’s predicted energy shortfall resulting from the combination of a booming economy and growing population. The Turkish government has announced plans for civilian nuclear power to provide a quarter of Turkey’s electricity needs by 2040. But even this three-decade timeline seems overly optimistic given the inchoate nature of Turkey’s nuclear research.

The Egyptians are way ahead of the Turks in developing nuclear infrastructure, but don’t expect to see the rise of a nuclear power on the Nile anytime soon. Egypt’s nuclear program is actually older than India’s, and was established only three years after Israel founded its Atomic Energy Commission. The Egyptian Atomic Energy Commission, which Gamal Abdel Nasser established in 1955, was exclusively dedicated to the development of peaceful atomic energy, though there were suspicions to the contrary. The 1956 nuclear cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union transferred to Egypt a 2-megawatt light water reactor that only produced small amounts of plutonium.

There were, of course, worrying signs about the Egyptian program — specifically Cairo’s refusal to open the Inshas reactor to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection until after the peace treaty with Israel. Yet neither President Anwar Sadat nor his successor, the recently deposed Hosni Mubarak, ever made any effort to develop nuclear weapons technology. Sadat signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1980, and Mubarak negotiated with the United States, France, Canada, and Germany for reactors and funding for Egypt’s nuclear program. Nothing, however, ever came of these discussions because of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster — and the fact that the Egyptians never signed what is known as the Additional Protocol, which gives the IAEA enhanced powers to inspect nuclear facilities. Given the trajectory of Egypt’s nuclear development, Cairo’s rejection of the Additional Protocol had more to do with politics and sovereignty than plans for a clandestine weapons program.

Even after Mubarak’s son Gamal triumphantly declared at the ruling party’s 2006 convention that Egypt was going to ramp up its nuclear development program, it is hard to believe that Egyptians ever really took him seriously. Mubarak spent $160 million on consultants to tell him where to build 10 planned nuclear power plants, and selected a location along the Mediterranean for the first one. But each of the power plants comes with a price tag of $1.5 billion — and this is a country that in the last 15 months has spent approximately $26 billion of its $36 billion foreign currency reserves just to stay afloat.

One has to wonder about the pundits’ warning of an Egyptian bomb: **Have they even been to Egypt lately**? If so, they might have a better grasp of Egypt’s **ramshackle infrastructure** and the **dire state of its economy**, neither of which can support a nuclear program.

What about **Saudi Arabia**, then, the Sunni power that is on the tip of most analysts’ tongues when it comes to Shiite Iran getting the bomb? Saudi Arabia has the cash to make large-scale investments in nuclear technology. Indeed, the only factor that makes warnings about Saudi proliferation — such as that delivered by former Ambassador the United States Prince Turki al-Faisal last year — even remotely credible is the resources the Saudis can muster to buy a nuclear program. Yet, while Riyadh can outfit itself with nuclear facilities with ease, it does **not have the capacity to manage them**. Mohamed Khilewi, a former Saudi diplomat, claims that the kingdom has been developing a nuclear arsenal to counter Israel since the mid-1970s — but he offers no substantiated evidence to support these claims.

In fact, the country has no nuclear facilities and no scientific infrastructure to support them. It’s possible that Saudi Arabia could import Pakistanis to do the work for them. But while Saudis feel comfortable with Pakistanis piloting some of their warplanes and joining their ground forces, setting up a nuclear program subcontracted with Pakistani know-how — or even acquiring a nuclear device directly from Islamabad — poses a range of **political risks** for the House of Saud. No doubt there would be considerable international opprobrium. Certainly Washington, which implicitly extends its nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia, would have a jaundiced view of a nuclear deal between Riyadh and Islamabad. Moreover, it’s one thing to hand the keys to an F-15 over to a foreigner, but letting them run your nuclear program is another matter altogether.

The concern about Saudi proliferation stems from fears that the kingdom would be forced to act if both Iran and Israel possessed a nuclear arsenal. "We cannot live in a situation where Iran has nuclear weapons and we don’t," an unnamed Saudi official declared to the Guardian on the sidelines of a meeting between Prince Turki al Faisal and NATO officials in June 2011. "It’s as simple as that. If Iran develops a nuclear weapon, that will be unacceptable to us and we will have to follow suit."

Yet given the fact that the Saudis have very little nuclear infrastructure to speak of, this kind of statement is little more than posturing designed to force the U.S. hand on Iran. Unlike similar warnings by Israel, which has the capacity to follow through on its threat to attack Iran’s nuclear sites, Riyadh’s rhetoric about acquiring nuclear weapons is **empty**. What is amazing is how many people take the Saudis seriously. If Khilewi had been telling the truth, now would seem like a good time for the Riyadh to give Tehran a look at what the royal family has been hiding in the palace basement all these years — but so far, we have only heard crickets.

Despite its flimsiness, it is hard to ignore the utility of the Middle East’s nuclear dominoes theory. For those who advocate a preventive military strike on Iran, it provides a sweeping geopolitical rationale for a dangerous operation. But the evidence doesn’t bear this argument out: If Washington decides it has no other option than an attack, it should do so because Iran is a threat in its own right, and not because it belives it will thwart inevitable proliferation in places like Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. It won’t, for the simple reason that there is **no reason** to believe these countries represent a proliferation risk in the first place.

### AT Prolif---No Impact

#### **No nuke prolif – too expensive, too difficult, and no one cares**

Mueller 18 (John Mueller – senior fellow at the Cato Institute, “Nuclear Weapons Don’t Matter”, CATO Institute, 15 October 2018, <https://www.cato.org/commentary/nuclear-weapons-dont-matter>, MG)

\*edited for ableist language

HOW ABOUT PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM?

Great powers are one thing, some might say, but rogue states or terrorist groups are another. If they go nuclear, it’s game over — which is why any further proliferation must be prevented by all possible measures, up to and including war.

That logic might seem plausible at first, but it **breaks down on close examination**. Not only has the world already survived the acquisition of nuclear weapons by some of the [~~craziest~~] mass murderers in history (Stalin and Mao), but proliferation has **slowed down** rather than sped up over time. Dozens of technologically sophisticated countries have considered obtaining nuclear arsenals, but very few have done so. This is because nuclear weapons turn out to be **difficult and expensive** to acquire and strategically **provocative to possess**.

They have not even proved to enhance status much, as many expected they would. Pakistan and Russia may garner more attention today than they would without nukes, but would Japan’s prestige be increased if it became nuclear? Did China’s status improve when it went nuclear — or when its economy grew? And would anybody really care (or even notice) if the current British or French nuclear arsenal was doubled or halved?

Alarmists have misjudged not only the pace of proliferation but also its effects. Proliferation is incredibly dangerous and necessary to prevent, we are told, because going nuclear would supposedly empower rogue states and lead them to dominate their region. The details of how this domination would happen are rarely discussed, but the general idea seems to be that once a country has nuclear weapons, it can use them to threaten others and get its way, with nonnuclear countries deferring or paying ransom to the local bully out of fear.

Except, of course, that in three‐​quarters of a century, the United States has **never been able to get anything close to that obedience** from anybody, even when it had a nuclear monopoly. So why should it be true for, say, Iran or North Korea? It is far more likely that a nuclear rogue’s threats would cause its rivals to **join together against the provocateur** — just as countries around the Persian Gulf responded to Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait by closing ranks to oppose, rather than acquiescing in, his effort at domination.

#### **Statistical modelling proves no nuke prolif impact**

Cohen 16 (Michael D. Cohen PhD - convenor of the National Security College’s PhD program and Senior Lecturer at the Crawford School of Public Policy, “How nuclear proliferation causes conflict: the case for optimistic pessimism”, The Nonproliferation Review, 2016, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10736700.2016.1256541>, MG)

University of Pennsylvania’s Michael Horowitz conducted a statistical analysis and found that the probability of new nuclear states reciprocating disputes quickly increases and then **decreases over time.**

The probability that a nuclear state will reciprocate a dispute with a non-nuclear state drops from .53 one year after developing nuclear weapons to .23 in year 56. Two new nuclear powers are 67 percent more likely to reciprocate a dispute than two average non-nuclear states. Two experienced nuclear powers are 65 percent less likely to reciprocate than two average non-nuclear states. The probability of dispute reciprocation between an experienced and new nuclear power is 26 percent greater than two non-nuclear states, and the probability of a very experienced state and a somewhat experienced state reciprocating is 42 percent less than two non-nuclear states.86

University of California-San Diego’s Erik Gartzke conducted a similar statistical test when the dependent variable was dispute initiation rather than reciprocation and found similarly robust results.87 Gartzke found that, while the overall effect of nuclear proliferation on conflict propensity is neutral, there is variation in the effect of proliferation over time. Nuclear proliferation influences the **timing, rather than the occurrence**, of disputes. While new nuclear states are prone to initiate militarized disputes, over time they moderate their policies and become as **likely to initiate disputes as they were before nuclear proliferation**.88 These effects wash out in statistical tests that do not control for experience with nuclear weapons. In short, if Iran and North Korea develop nuclear weapons and challenge their regional status quo, the historical record suggests that they will not do so for long. Thus James M. Lindsay and Ray Takeyh of the Council on Foreign Relations recently claimed that a nuclear Iran would be most dangerous “at first, when it would likely be at its most reckless.” But, “like other nuclear aspirants before them, the guardians of the theocracy might discover that nuclear bombs are **simply not good** for diplomatic leverage or strategic aggrandizement.” 89

Conclusion: proliferation pessimism, Iran, and North Korea

Three of the four mechanisms long alleged to make nuclear proliferation cause interstate conflict find **little to no empirical support** when the endogeneity, omitted-variable bias, and conceptual-confusion issues addressed above are recognized and applied to the evidence. Preventive-war motivations, nonsurvivable arsenals, and organizational logics that lead to accidents do not cause armed conflict. The only mechanism that has systematically led to conflict is conventional aggression by weak revisionists after nuclear proliferation, but a few years of experience with nuclear weapons moderates the conflict propensity of new nuclear states. By failing to specify how frequently we should observe preventive motivations, their effect on nonsurvivable arsenals, or how organizational logics lead to conflict, accidents, and nuclear war, **proliferation pessimist claims are unfalsifiable**. Pessimist scholars need to specify how much longer we should observe them not leading to conflict before concluding that their threat has been greatly exaggerated.

The undesirability of nuclear use has prevented scholars from coming to terms with what a more careful and systematic reading of the historical record suggests about the relationship between these mechanisms and conflict. Sagan has argued that proliferation fatalism and deterrence optimism reduce incentives to combat proliferation.90 But these same dynamics have led scholars to **vastly exaggerate** the number of threats posed by the spread of nuclear weapons. If the greatest danger posed by nuclear proliferation is conventional aggression in the short-term, scholars need to rediscover how **deterrence** can moderate the high conflict propensity of new nuclear states.91 Arguments about the frequency of nuclear escalation, however, say nothing about its cost. Isn’t the possibility of nuclear escalation on the Korean peninsula, for example, evidence against the arguments made throughout this paper? A few cases of accidental, unintentional, or deliberate nuclear escalation could show that the mechanisms offered by pessimist scholars linking nuclear proliferation and conflict survive the criticisms leveled at them here. A lower bar for the proliferation-pessimist theory to pass might be one case of nuclear escalation. But after seventy years, nuclear weapons have **not once** led to conflict through the mechanisms addressed here.

#### **Studies prove nuclear prolif has either no effect on the risk of interstate conflict or reverses it**

Suzuki 15 (Akisato Suzuki - Adjunct Research Fellow at the School of Politics and International Relations, University College Dublin, “Is more better or worse? New empirics on nuclear proliferation and interstate conflict by Random Forests”, Research and Politics, 2015, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2053168015589625>, MG)

The main findings reveal that the optimist expectation of the relationship between nuclear proliferation and interstate conflict is empirically supported:9 first, a larger number of nuclear states on average **decreases** the systemic propensity for interstate conflict; and second, there is **no clear evidence** that the emergence of new nuclear states increases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict. Gartzke and Jo (2009) argue that nuclear weapons themselves have no exogenous effect on the probability of conflict, because when a state is engaged in or expects to engage in conflict, it may develop nuclear weapons to keep fighting, or to prepare for, that conflict. If this selection effect existed, the analysis should overestimate the conflict-provoking effect of nuclear proliferation in the above model. Still, the results indicate that a larger number of nuclear states are associated with fewer disputes in the system.

This conclusion, however, raises questions about how to reconcile this study’s findings with those of a recent quantitative dyadic-level study (Bell and Miller, 2015). The current paper finds that nuclear proliferation **decreases** the systemic propensity for interstate conflict, while Bell and Miller (2015) find that nuclear symmetry has no significant effect on dyadic conflict, but that nuclear asymmetry is associated with a higher probability of dyadic conflict. It is possible that nuclear proliferation **decreases conflict** through the conflict-mitigating effects of extended nuclear deterrence and/or fear of nuclear states’ intervention, to the extent that these effects **overwhelm** the conflict-provoking effect of nuclear–asymmetrical dyads. Thus, dyadic-level empirics cannot solely be relied on to infer causal links between nuclear proliferation and a systemic propensity for conflict. The systemic-level empirics deserve attention.